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Abstract
Health care reform in Latin America has been a continuous process over recent decades,
and several countries have implemented programs of universal care. This dissertation looks
at the implementation of universal care programs in Brazil and Mexico, and highlights the
politics of implementing these reforms. In the rst paper, I evaluate the implementation of
infrastructural reforms as part of Seguro Popular in Mexico. I conclude that the reforms were
partially successful, but that success varied considerably by region. In the second paper, I
show that spending on health care in Brazil is strongly related to political partisanship, and
that the reform process has not signicantly changed this relationship. In the third paper,
I suggest that individual characteristics, and not political variables, best explain variations
in the quality of care patients receive in Brazil. As a whole, these papers serve to highlight
the understudied role of politics in the implementation of health care reform.
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xPart I
Introduction
1Although health reform has been a continuous process in the developing world
since the mid-twentieth century, most literature addressing the topic comes from either public
health professionals or economists. The medical profession has oered increasingly complex
and expensive treatments and research agendas, and public health scholars have worked to
incorporate these agendas into a system which is both sustainable and fair at the national
level, with participants in the system coming from varied socioeconomic backgrounds and
with diering insurance schemes. Often, the public health discussion centers around optimal
structuring of health systems, cost-eciency, and resource allocation. Although scholars
disagree about the relative values of dierent approaches, there is broad agreement that ap-
proaches to reform which center on using scarce public health resources in an eective way
should be the cornerstone of any public health reform agenda.
In the past decade and a half, however, social science has begun to make inroads
into the discussion, noting that health reform and health care are inherently political pro-
cesses, subject to the same kinds of political considerations as other economic decisions. One
example of this direction in the developed world has been discussion centered around the
lack of a universal health care system in the United States (Hacker, 2001). In the develop-
ing world, this conversation has often centered around demands on the state from society
(Weyland, 1995) as well as processes such as pharmaceutical policy reform (Reich, 1995).
In the developing literature on the politics of health care reform in both the developed and
developing world, political scientists have overwhelmingly concluded that even the best-laid
and most economically sound health plans do not always get implemented in practice, often
because they are not politically feasible in the way that they were designed. As Jonathan
Oberlander (2003) puts it, \Bad things indeed do happen to good health reform plans. Yet
political calculations are too often a footnote in health care reform proposals" (p. 392).
2In their analysis of the politics of the health reform process, political scientists
have oered numerous theoretical approaches designed to help explain why structurally sound
health plans are not executed in practice. One approach is through collective action (Tarrow,
1994; Beaglehole et al., 2004), in which scholars suggest that reforms are not undertaken be-
cause, although there would be an overall benet to society under reform, the cost to any one
individual of her eort in undertaking the reform is greater than the benets that she might
expect to receive in return. As each individual thus makes the calculation not to participate,
reform is not undertaken. Another approach to explaining the politics of health reform is
the \critical juncture" approach (Pierson, 2000; Markel & Golden, 2005). In this approach,
scholars argue that there are particular windows of opportunity, or critical junctures, for
change, but after those points there are increasing returns to the chosen path, and change
becomes more dicult due to entrenched interests. Thus, in the context of health reform,
reformers must seize moments of opportunity to implement change before it becomes more
dicult.
Although the list of political science approaches which have been applied to health
care is much more extensive than this, political science's broader approach can be charac-
terized as one which frequently focuses on the reform process itself, with less attention to
the politics of executing aspects of the care system. For example, political science has of-
fered multiple explanations for the processes of health reform in Brazil and Mexico, with
little discussion of how politics aects the performance of implemented changes. Questions
concerning the eect of politics on the functioning of the health system have received com-
paratively little attention.
In the papers that follow, I address three separate issues related to the politics of
health care performance in Latin America, and specically in Brazil and Mexico. The rst
3paper presented here evaluates the success of the Seguro Popular reform process in Mexico.
In this paper, I examine the process of health reform in Mexico and undertake a prelim-
inary study of the eectiveness of reforms related to medication distribution. I nd that
eectiveness diers greatly by state, and suggest that further study from an institutional
performance perspective would be useful.
In the second paper, I ask about the impact of political partisanship on health
care expenditures, and how that trend may have changed over time. Although questions of
partisanship and social spending are by no means new to political science, few studies have
focused specically on health care spending, and I know of no other study which considers
health care spending at the subnational level in Brazil. In this paper, I ultimately conclude
that political partisanship does seem to be important in explaining health care expenditures
at the municipal level in Brazil.
Finally, I take up the question of the quality of health services in Brazil, and
ask whether electoral considerations, and specically alignment of local and state parties,
result in better reported quality of services by patients. This paper is motivated by litera-
ture on pork barrel spending and partisan politics (Desposato, 2006) which has suggested
a link between party alignment at dierent levels of government and available pork-barrel
resources. I also consider the importance of the PT, an often singled out party in Brazil for
its grassroots organization and local focus. Ultimately, I conclude that political factors are
less helpful to explain variations in quality than are individual level characteristics such as
age and socioeconomic status.
In its entirety, I hope this dissertation will serve as a push for political science
to take the issue of health care, and not just the reform process itself, very seriously as a
4subject of future study. The papers presented here suggest that issues of political partisan-
ship, state strength, and bureaucratic incentives are critical to an understanding of when
health systems function eectively, and what incentives should be taken into consideration
beyond eciency and cost-eectiveness. Health care and health care reform is inherently
political, and the aim of this dissertation is to solidify this connection as well as propose
future research directions.
5Part II
Paper I: An Evaluation of Impact on
Infrastructure and Medication
Supplies under Mexico's Seguro
Popular
60.1 Introduction
Mexico underwent an unprecedented process of democratization during the 1990s, cul-
minating in the election of Vicente Fox, the rst president of Mexico from a party other than
the Partido Revolutionario Institucional, during the summer of 2000. As elsewhere in Latin
America, the process of democratization gave new political space to issues of social welfare
and justice. Among the items on the social welfare agenda was the perceived inequity of
the health care system, specically concerning both access to and quality of services. At the
onset of democratization, more than half of all Mexicans lacked health insurance, and thus
nancial protection from catastrophic health expenditures (Knaul & Frenk, 2005). As an
indication of the state of Mexico's health system at the time of democratization, the 2000
WHO health system performance assessment ranked Mexico's health system as 144 out of
191 countries on nancial fairness (World Health Organization [WHO], 2000).
In 2003, Julio Frenk, Minister of Health of Mexico at the time, unveiled a new
health reform program called Seguro Popular to address the inequities of the Mexican health
system and expand access to uninsured Mexicans, with a particular focus on reducing out
of pocket catastrophic health expenditures. Seguro Popular was designed as an optional
nationwide insurance program available to insure Mexicans without other access to health
care, covering 100% of primary health care needs as well as approximately 275 interventions
which represent about 95% of diseases, diagnostics, and hospital services (Ja, 2010). Seguro
Popular is implemented through the Sistema de Protecci on en Salud, which was created as
part of a 2003 General Health Law. The health reforms of the early 2000s have a legal
underpinning in Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution, which guarantees that all individuals
have a right to protection of their health, and that the nation and states will jointly provide
for such services.
7Seguro Popular had, at its core, several specic aims for the improvement of
health care in Mexico. First, it aimed to increase public spending on health and restructure
nancing in a way that made basic health services accessible to all Mexicans. Specically, it
aimed to reduce catastrophic health expenditures for families by managing the risk of out-of
pocket health payments. Another aim of Seguro Popular was to achieve greater eciency
in allocation of state resources for health care through cost-eective interventions. Seguro
Popular also aimed to shift health system incentives to the demand side in the hopes of
encouraging competition and consequent improvements in the quality of services oered.
Finally, Seguro Popular aimed to increase the infrastructure and resources of the health sys-
tem in Mexico, through the construction of additional health facilities, increases in health
personnel, and improved availability of medications (Knaul & Frenk, 2005). Although nu-
merous evaluations of Seguro Popular have been published (King et al., 2009; Rosa-Rubi et
al., 2009; Gakidou et al., 2007), few of these evaluations have focused on Seguro Popular's
performance in achieving its aim to improve the infrastructure and resources of the health
system in Mexico. Furthermore, this is the rst study, to my knowledge, to assess Seguro
Popular's impact on medication supplies in participant communities.
In this paper, we undertake an initial evaluation of Seguro Popular's eect on
availability of medications as well as changes in medication usage in Mexico. We argue that
there is strong evidence of a relationship between a health cluster's rate of enrollment in
Seguro Popular and increases in medication supplies to that cluster. We further argue that
this eect is driven by the treatment clusters, and one observes no such relationship in con-
trol areas. This makes sense theoretically, as control clusters were not awarded additional
medication supplies contingent on enrollment rates.
8In the second part of the paper, we examine the second step of this chain, the
eect of increased medication availability on medication usage rates. We nd that medica-
tion usage increased signicantly over the period of the study, but that this increased usage
cannot be tied directly to areas in which Seguro Popular medication stock had increased.
We oer a discussion on why this may be the case, focusing in particular on the nature of
the generic pharmaceuticals market.
0.2 Background
Although the politics of health care reform might seem to be a natural extension of
debates about the welfare state, \students of the welfare state... have devoted surprisingly
little attention" to these crucial disputes, leaving the eld \almost entirely to health policy
specialists" (Hacker, 2004, p. 693). As a result, much of the discussion concerning health
care reform has centered on the optimal design of health systems, with inadequate attention
to the role of politics in creating those institutions. As Lakin (2010) asks in his study of
the politics of Seguro Popular's implementation, \how dicult is it to change a country's
institutions in the health sector?" (p. 314).
Political science work on institutions and institutional change oers great insight
into explaining outcomes of health care reform. For example, Hacker (2004), in a study
of outcomes of health care reform in Britain, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and the
United States, observed a pattern of \reform without change and change without reform".
That is, at times policies were undertaken which failed to inuence medical structures, while
at other times important policy and structural changes seemed to occur without national
health reform. While Hacker explains this paradox in terms of centralization, suggesting
9that change is most likely to occur under decentralized systems, one could also consider
the outcomes observed through the lens of the institutional change model of Mahoney and
Thelen (2010). In Mahoney and Thelen's model, the manner in which institutional change
occurs is a function of both the level of discretion in government implementation of policy
and the facility which which new laws can be vetoed. In cases with high levels of discre-
tion, one can expect changes to the way rules are implemented either due to changes in the
environment or to political opportunism. It should be clear, then, that cases in which the
implementation of health policy is done at the subnational level with great discretion, one
could expect implementation to be vulnerable to change both over time and over space.
The process by which medications are allocated to public health facilities in Mexico
is done at the subnational level, and there is signicant discretion across states in determin-
ing the formulas and schedules for how medication needs should be met. As a result, the
process of medication distribution may be subject to political constraints and trends in ways
not addressed previously. Although Lakin (2009, 2010) discusses in detail the politics of the
Seguro Popular reform process, much of his analysis focuses on the politics of how policies
were adopted. In the case of medication distribution to health clusters, the more important
aspect of politics which deserves consideration is the extent to which institutions are func-
tioning, and will continue to function, in accordance with the intent of the policies on paper.
When law and practice do not accord, literature on institutional change and the development
of informal institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006) will be helpful in understanding how such
gaps develop.
I now turn to a discussion of the health system in Mexico leading to the Seguro
Popular reform, as well as a discussion of the medication purchasing and distribution process
which highlights the role of state institutions in controlling the implementation of Seguro
10Popular policies.
0.3 The Implementation of Seguro Popular in Mexico
Until 2003, Mexicans were not provided health services through social security program-
ming, which frequently resulted in high out-of pocket expenditures on health and inconsistent
availability of services and medications. IMSS covered the health care of private sector work-
ers and their families (40% of the population), and additional insurance programs covered
another 10%, but this left approximately half of all Mexicans without prepaid insurance in
the period leading up to the Seguro Popular reform. Although uninsured individuals were
able to access state and federal health facilities in exchange for user fees, facility users were
nonetheless exposed to substantial individual costs, and often faced understang and med-
ication shortages (Frenk et al., 2006). As discussed above, much of the motivation for the
Seguro Popular reform program stemmed from hopes to reduce out-of-pocket expenditures
at the point of services, as well as increase medical resources to underserved communities.
A key foundational idea of the health reform in Mexico was to move from the
national health service system described here to a national insurance model, in which a na-
tional health insurance plan would cover a certain dened set of health needs and services,
and program participants could be treated by any provider accepting government payment,
including private providers. The focus for the government, then, is on the nancing of the
system rather than a public network of service provision. Furthermore, government subsi-
dization would be determined primarily by demand (patients in need of care) rather than
supply (guaranteed funding for certain types of personnel and/or facilities), introducing in-
creased competition for the delivery of health services and, in theory, more ecient service
11delivery.
In 2003, Mexico passed the General Health Law which created a System of Social
Protection for Health (Sistema de Protecci on Social en Salud, which was designed to admin-
ister the national health insurance, Seguro Popular. Seguro Popular is a voluntary insurance
designed to be available, though not required, for all citizens. It was specically designed
for the purpose of making available an insurance program to those who were not already
insured through the formal sector. Individuals eligible to aliate with Seguro Popular must
meet eligibility requirements based on age, residency, or family aliation, and demonstrate
that they are ineligible for insurance through other programs such as IMSS.
The nancing of Seguro Popular is through the federal government, state govern-
ments, and individuals. Individual contributions are calculated on the basis of income, with
income groups divided into deciles and lower income individuals exempt from contributions
to Seguro Popular. The highest individual contribution level, or annual cuota, is the equiva-
lent of less than USD $1000. Although in theory individual level contributions should be an
important component of the nancing for Seguro Popular, scholars (Lakin, 2009) have shown
that in practice individual contributions have not been collected at prescribed rates. Federal
and state funds have continued to be the principal sources of funding for the program, and
investments in the program continue to increase.
Individuals who enroll in Seguro Popular receive health coverage for approximately
275 medical operations as well as specic medical and pharmaceutical resources. They are
eligible to access these services and medications at any facility aliated with Seguro Popular.
From the demand side, then, aliation with Seguro Popular and the distribution of local
clinics aliated with the program are the central determinants of changing health needs as a
12result of the health reform in Mexico. To understand the way in which these needs are met
(or not), it is also necessary to have an understanding of the supply side of Seguro Popular's
resources, and for the purpose of this paper, specically medications. In the next section, I
provide an overview of the distribution and supply process for medications through Seguro
Popular.
0.4 Distribution and Supply of Medications through
Seguro Popular
Medication purchasing and distribution in Mexico for public sector purchases is regu-
lated in several dierent ways in an eort to minimize the public nancial burden as well as
promote ecient allocation of pharmaceuticals in accordance with changing demand. First,
the process by which medications are able to be purchased is subject to specic requirements
laid out in the Law of Acquisitions, Leasing, and Services of the Public Sector. The ways
in which purchase quantities are determined are discussed briey below. Distribution then
occurs through the state level to local health clinics. The types of medications which can be
purchased for the public sector are regulated by the Cuadro B asico (Basic Formulary) and
Cat alogo de Insumos (Catalogue of Inputs), lists used by both the Ministry of Health and
social security agencies. Finally, pricing is strictly regulated in accordance with health laws
in both 1951 and 1984 as well as more recent revisions.
130.4.1 Purchasing Process
Medicines purchased by public sector institutions are required to follow the regulations
of the Law of Acquisitions, Leasing, and Services of the Public Sector, which dictates three
manners in which pharmaceuticals can be bought: (1) public biddings, (2) invitations to
at least 3 people/organizations, and (3) direct negotiations (Moise & Docteur, 2006). The
most common of these manners for pharmaceutical purchases in the public sector is public
biddings. Most of the biddings involve domestic manufacturers, although under certain cir-
cumstances international manufacturers may participate. The direct negotiation process is
most appropriate for patent-protected medications with only one producer for which bidding
would therefore be unsuitable.
Each individual purchasing institution (IMSS, ISSSTE, SSA, PEMEX, SEDENA)
makes its own determinations about purchasing needs, and these determinations are made
at the subnational level. There is signicant autonomy in both the processes for determining
needs and the processes for purchasing, both by institution and by region. The purchas-
ing formulas include inventory information and information about demands on local health
facilities in their calculations of medication needs, but formulas can dier a great deal by
region, according to ocials familiar with the process.1 Thus, although there are basic cata-
logues of medications available which oer a general listing of available supplies and prices,
as discussed below, the institutions are quite autonomous in their individual drug acquisition
process.
IMSS purchases drugs through its 35 state delegations and 25 Medical Units of
High Specialty (Tertiary Level Hospitals) (Moise & Docteur, 2006). The purchasing process
1This information was received through email correspondence with Gregorio Sanchez, Subdirector of
Seguro Popular in the Federal District of Mexico.
14is initiated at the state level, where the purchasing unit calculates the pharmaceutical needs
of its medical centers, and compares this calculated need to present inventory to determine
purchasing needs. The state purchasing units then solicit bids for medications from manufac-
turers in a bidding process in accordance with the Law of Acquisitions. The winning bidder
eventually signs a contract with the purchasing unit (Moise & Docteur, 2006). Purchasing
units are also required to keep detailed records of medication usage and past purchases,
many of which are available through CompraNet (Ley de Adquisiciones, Arrendamientos Y
Servicios del Sector P ublico).
It is worth noting that changes to the distribution process had been planned at the
time that SP was rolled out. In particular, these planned changes involved moving toward
a reimbursement system, in which Mexicans would hold smart cards that stored identifying
information as well as specics about the health products to which they were entitled. By
swiping these smart cards at health facilities, they would be able to access products and
services, and they would also initiate an automatic process by which national health author-
ities would be informed about inventory and medication usage (Moise & Docteur, 2006).
Notably, these changes to the distribution process had not occurred at the point that our
evaluation of SP took place.
0.4.2 Available Medications
The Cuadro B asico (Basic Formulary) and Cat alogo de Insumos (Catalogue of Inputs)
are the two lists from which the Ministry of Health and social security agencies purchase
their pharmaceuticals. Whereas the Basic Formulary is comprised of products appropriate
for primary care, the Catalogue of Inputs includes drugs for care at the secondary and tertiary
levels. The 2005 editions of the Basic Formulary and the Catalogue of Inputs list a total
15of 776 generic names of drugs (Moise & Docteur, 2006). Requests for changes and updates
to drug listings in the Catalogue of Inputs and Basic Formulary can be made through the
Interinstitutional Commission of the Basic Formulary of Inputs of the Health Sector, which
includes representatives from the Ministry of Health and IMSS among other health agencies.
0.4.3 Pricing
Mexico's pharmaceutical industry is one of only two which have price regulations in
place, although these regulations have become more exible in recent years. Both the 1951
Act on Federal Executive Attributions in Economic Matters and the 1984 General Health
Law worked to set maximum retail prices for drugs based on calculated supplier costs and
prot margins. Although there have been previous attempts to loosen this pricing scheme,
the most recent eort occurred in 2004. The Ministry of the Economy now administers
this most recent maximum price regulation scheme, under which regulation applies only to
patent-protected drugs in the private market, an international reference price (PIR, or Precio
Internacional de Referencia) services as a maximum price threshold, and manufacturers can
set the price for drugs with no comparable alternative (Moise & Docteur, 2006). In practice,
the procurement price for many common drugs is well below the maximum price (Instituto
Mexicano del Seguro Social [IMSS], 2004).
0.5 Research Design
When Seguro Popular was introduced in 2005, Gary King and a team of researchers in
conjunction with the Mexican Health Secretary and the Mexican National Institute of Public
Health designed a randomized experiment such that an evaluation of health outcomes and
behavior in the program could take place both at the individual and the health facilities
16level. The project (King et al., 2009) was designed as a matched-pair cluster-randomised
experiment in which the research team identied 12,284 health clusters. A health cluster was
dened as a health clinic or hospital and the population of its catchment area. From among
these health clusters, 7078 (5439 rural and 1639 urban) clusters, from 13 out of 32 Mexi-
can states, agreed to join the evaluation experiment of Seguro Popular. From among these
possible health clusters, King et al. selected 74 pairs of health clusters from among seven
states. Figure 1 shows the seven states from which the nal health cluster pairs were selected.
Figure 1: States From Which Paired Health Clusters Were Drawn (Figure from King et al.,
2009)
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Final clusters were included based on requisite administrative and political fea-
tures, and cluster pairs were matched on characteristics such as cluster size (King et al.,
2009). Within each pair, one health cluster was selected for treatment and and one was
chosen as the control. Within treatment clusters, the research team launched a campaign to
17enroll families in Seguro Popular, and the state in which the treatment cluster was located
implemented eorts to increase medical personnel and drug supplies in the treatment facility.
Control health clusters received nothing additional.
0.5.1 Household Survey
Two separate surveys were conducted as part of the evaluation of Seguro Popular, a
household survey and a health facilities survey. Both the household and facilities survey were
conducted at a baseline observation point between August 2005 and September 2005 and
again at a follow-up point between July 2006 and August 2006. As part of the household
survey, individual households were interviewed in each of 100 of the original 148 clusters.
The 100 clusters were selected based on within-pair similarity and expected compliance. The
distribution of health clusters in which the household survey was conducted by state is shown
in Table 1.
State Number of Clusters
in Household Survey
Guerrero 8
Jalisco 2
Estado do M exico 54
Morelos 26
Oaxaca 4
San Luis Potos  4
Sonora 2
Table 1: Distribution of Health Clusters used in Household Survey by State
Initially, a total of 36,181 households selected randomly were contacted as part
of the survey, and 32,515 of these were at least partially surveyed at the baseline phase. Of
the 32,515 households initially surveyed, 29,897 households were re-surveyed post-treatment.
18Multiple imputation techniques were used for missing values and are discussed by King et al
(2009). The nal household dataset includes 16,259 households from treatment clusters and
16,256 households from control clusters. Appendix A shows King et al. (2009)'s owchart
showing the process of household sampling, response, and attrition rates during the house-
hold survey.
0.5.2 Facilities Survey
The second survey that was conducted as part of the evaluation of Seguro Popular was
a health facilities survey. Whereas analyses drawing on the household survey were previously
published as part of the evaluation project, the health facilities data have not been used for
scholarly research prior to this project. The facilities survey was conducted for the purposes
of collecting data on personnel, clinic operation, and clinic supplies at facilities of interest,
which would eventually allow for the evaluation of Seguro Popular's aim to increase supplies
and access to health care to those enrolled in the program.
A total of 140 of the 148 health facilities were surveyed at both baseline and
treatment periods, where each health facility refers to the health clinic or hospital provid-
ing services to the catchment area of a given health cluster. However, only the 100 health
clusters chosen for the matched pair design discussed above were used in the data analysis.
From these 148 health facilities, 100 were chosen in a matched-pair design, where one facility
in each cluster was chosen as a treatment facility, and one was chosen as a control facility.
As shown in Table 1, the majority of these clusters came from Mexico State and Morelos,
with the remaining 20 facilities chosen from Guerrero, Jalisco, Oaxaca, San Luis Polos , and
Sonora.
19The questions posed on the facilities survey fell broadly into three categories:
personnel, infrastructure and equipment, and medications. Personnel questions included
questions about the physician and nursing sta, professional and technical personnel such
as pharmacologists and radiologists, and other personnel such as administrative and mainte-
nance sta. Questions regarding infrastructure and equipment focused on available oces,
operating rooms (if applicable), service and transitory beds, and medical equipment such
as X-ray machines and respirators. The medications section of the survey reported each
medication present in a given health facility at the time of survey, the total number of units
of that medication available to all patients, and the number of units available only to Seguro
Popular patients, if applicable. Due to the design of the survey, at many facilities the data
collection team did not distinguish correctly between medications that were available to all
patients and those which were available only to Seguro Popular patients. Consequently, we
have only used data for the total number of medications at each facility in our analysis.
The data that were collected on medications from the facilities survey were coded
separately without regard for generic versus name brand distinctions or the primary indica-
tion of the data. For example, \Tylenol" and \Acetaminophen" would have been coded as
separate medications. We therefore created a variable coded according to the main indica-
tion for which one would expect a given medication to be used at a local health facility. The
11 main indications under which every medication was coded are shown in Table 2.
Although of course some medications have multiple indications and could have
been categorized under more than one indication, most had a primary or most probable
use, particularly in the context of a community health clinic. In a few cases, a medication
was either used for an unusual purpose (such as toxicology), or its main indication was so
ambiguous that it could not be readily categorized. These medications were coded under
20Table 2: Medication Indication Codings
Indication
(1) infection
(2) respiratory
(3) cardiac, blood, cholesterol
(4) pain, allergies, inammation
(5) GI disorders
(6) glycemic disorders
(7) vitamin/mineral deciencies
(8) neurological
(9) endocrine and birth control
(10) vaccine
(11) other
\other". All codings were done in consultation with a pharmacologist and physician, and
the medications which were categorized under each indication are listed in Appendix B. For
each facility in the facilities survey, we calculated the number of medications available at
that facility for each indication at both baseline and post-treatment, as well as the total
number of medications available. These new facility-level medications totals were merged
with the personnel and infrastructure facility-level data into a nal health facilities dataset.
In addition to generating the medications data for completion of the facilities
data as discussed above, we generated new facility-level variables related to medication us-
age from the household survey. In the household survey, individuals were asked if they suer
from any one of the following seven chronic conditions: arthritis, chest pain, asthma, de-
pression, diabetes, hypertension, or high cholesterol. They were further asked whether they
were receiving medication or treatment for their chronic condition(s). We aggregated these
variables to the facility-level by creating a variable for the total number of chronic conditions
reported for individuals in a given health cluster at baseline and post-treatment. We also
created a variable for `unmet need', or the dierence between reported chronic conditions in
21a health cluster and medication usage for treating these conditions. Thus, the nal dataset
used for this paper included all of the data from the facilities survey as well as variables for
chronic conditions, medication usage, and unmet need for medication generated from the
household survey.
0.6 Analysis
Descriptive statistics of the treatment and control clusters suggest that the treatment
was eective in enrolling residents of treatment areas in Seguro Popular. Whereas the control
clusters saw an average increase of only a few percent of residents enrolling in the program,
treatment clusters saw an average increase of nearly 35% (Table 3). It is worth noting that
the enrollment levels for the baseline period in both control and treatment clusters are non-
zero because baseline data were being collected as the program was being rolled out, so
there were opportunities in some clusters to enroll before initial data collection took place.
Furthermore, these rates were higher in treatment districts, since the treatment that was
occurring during the collection of baseline data was the promotion of the program. Another
important consideration is that the treatment for this study was marketing of the Seguro
Popular program and assistance with enrollment. However, enrollment was also available
to individuals in control clusters for those who sought it. Thus, it is not surprising to see
increases in enrollment over the evaluation period in both treatment and control clusters,
with larger increases in treatment clusters.
Although the trends in enrollment across states were similar, there were a few
noteworthy dierences. First, Mexico State was by far the most successful at enrolling indi-
viduals in the program, with more than 60% enrollment for treatment health clusters after
22Table 3: Changes in Seguro Popular Enrollment by State
Baseline Post-Treatment
Mexico State Treatment 17.06% 60.47%
Control 3.34 6.08
Morelos Treatment 6.37 26.78
Control .36 1.05
All Other States Treatment 20.05 44.86
Control 11.77 21.78
Average Treatment 14.88 48.59
Control 4.25 7.91
the treatment period (the comparable gure for Morelos was only 26.8%). States also varied
a lot in the percentage of individuals in control areas who enrolled in the program during the
evaluation period. Whereas nearly a quarter of such individuals in the clusters in Guerrero,
Jalisco, Oaxaca, San Luis Potos , and Sonora had enrolled, only about 1% of those in More-
los had. These large dierences between states suggest that there is important state-level
variation occurring in the aliation process of Seguro Popular.
The central outcome of interest in this analysis is the change in the total units
of medications available at health facilities between the baseline and post-treatment period.
In particular, we were interested in knowing whether changes in enrollment rates were as-
sociated with changes in the medication supplies available at health clinics. To determine
this, we simply looked at the total units of medication available for all indications at both
control and treatment facilities at baseline and post-treatment. Following Imai (2008), the
sample average treatment eect (SATE) in a matched-pair experiment design such as the
one conducted on Seguro Popular can be estimated by the following equation
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in which m denotes the SATE, n is the number of matched pairs, and Y is the outcome
of interest. Observed pairs are indexed by i. The variance for this estimator can be found
using the following equation
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in which ^  denotes the standard variance estimator, Z denotes the binary treatment assign-
ment, and n matched pairs are indexed by j, with ^ m as the SATE from Equation (1). A
visual of our results are shown in Figure 2. On average, we observe a noticeable increase in
the availability of total medication units for health facilities in both control and treatment
clusters. Appendix C shows the breakdown of medications by indications, suggesting this
increase was similar across dierent types of medication. Unfortunately, however, because
of the relatively high rates of missing medications data post-treatment, as well as high vari-
ability between clusters, the eect is not statistically signicant.
As with enrollment data, there were signicant dierences in medication availabil-
ity changes by state. In Mexico State, treatment clusters experienced much larger increases
in medication availability, on average, than did those in control clusters. The average dif-
ference between the change in medication available at treatment facilities and the change
available at control facilities was nearly 1000 units, equivalent to more than a third of the
total stock at control facilities. These data are shown in Table 4 and graphically in Figure
24Figure 2: Medication Units at Baseline and Treatment
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Morelos also experienced greater increases to stock at treatment facilities than at con-
trol facilities, although the dierence in units was only about half that of Mexico State. In
contrast, the ve other states in our study experienced, on average, greater increases to stock
at control facilities. There are two explanations for why this is the case. First, there were
only ten matched clusters among these ve states, making data interpretation less reliable.
25Table 4: Changes in Medication Units by State
Baseline Post-Treatment Dierence
Mexico State
Treatment 1921 4075
Control 1550 2714
Dierence 371 1361 990
Morelos
Treatment 1409 1139
Control 1380 598
Dierence 29 541 512
All Other States
Treatment 1116 2074
Control 1415 4194
Dierence -301 -2120 -1819
Average
Treatment 1627 2911
Control 1479 2460
Dierence 148 452 304
Second, there were signicant outliers from among these clusters, where an individual control
facility had accumulated an unusually large amount of medication over the treatment period.
The substantial dierence between medication stock changes in Morelos and Mex-
ico State, on one hand, and the other ve states in the study, on the other, is particularly
interesting because the cluster matches from Morelos and Mexico State composed 80% of the
observations in the study, and thus had the most resources geared toward implementation of
the Seguro Popular program. The data suggest, at least preliminarily, that implementation
may have been more eective in areas where enrollment was taking place at higher rates,
and perhaps economies of scale benetted some components of the implementation process.
The data on enrollment changes and medications strongly suggest that there was important
26Figure 3: DID States
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regional variation in how eective the Seguro Popular program aliation was.
As is clear from the enrollment data and medication availability data, the states
in which there were the greatest dierences in Seguro Popular enrollment between treatment
and control clusters were also the states in which the change in medication availability be-
tween treatment and control clusters was the greatest. Consequently, we performed a simple
regression analysis to determine whether this relationship was statistically signicant. In-
27terestingly, we found that there is a statistically signicant relationship between the percent
change in Seguro Popular enrollment and medication availability for treatment clusters, but
this relationship does not exist for control clusters. For all clusters, an increase in enrollment
in Seguro Popular of one percent was associated with an increase in medication availability
of approximately 30 units, and this relationship was signicant only at the p < :1 level.
However, in disaggregating the data it becomes clear that this relationship is being driven
by the treatment clusters. In treatment clusters, an increase in enrollment in Seguro Pop-
ular of one percent was associated with an increase in medication availability of about 60
units during the evaluation period, signicant at p < :01. On the other hand, there was no
signicant relationship between Seguro Popular enrollment in control clusters and increased
availability of medication.
The interesting relationship between enrollment and medication availability sug-
gests that, at least in treatment clusters, enrollment in Seguro Popular was associated with
greater distribution of medication to health clusters. Thus, the distribution formulas for
pharmaceutical needs discussed earlier seem to have been at least partially eective in dis-
tributing SP medications based on changing demand. The failure of this relationship to
hold in control clusters also accords with expectations based on how the program was im-
plemented. Specically, control clusters did not provide a Seguro Popular facility which
received medications through the state to be distributed to SP patients.2 While individuals
in control clusters were able to aliate with the SP program, they would need to travel to
treatment clusters to take advantage of SP services (Gakidou et al., 2006). Therefore, it
is unsurprising that there was no relationship between SP aliation in control clusters and
changes to medication stock in those clusters.
2The ability of a facility to aliate with Seguro Popular and thus receive pubic funding hinged on its
initial upgrading of the health facility (Knox, 2008).
28The second type of outcome in which we are interested is whether increased med-
ication supplies in clinics translated to higher rates of medication usage in the population.
To examine this relationship, we used data from the household survey on medication usage
by cluster to determine whether clusters in which medication availability had increased were
also experiencing increased rates of medication usage among residents of that health cluster.
In performing the regression analysis, we calculated cluster-robust standard errors using the
experiment package in R Version 2.15.0. We found no signicant relationship between the
change in medication availability, as measured, in a given health cluster, and the change in
medication usage in that cluster.
Table 5: Percent Individuals In Household Survey Taking At Least One Medication for a
Chronic Condition
Cluster Baseline Post-Treatment Dierence (95% CI)
Treatment 13.62% 17.50% 3.88 (3.09,4.67)
Control 14.04 17.74 3.70 (2.91,4.50)
Dierence -.42 -.24 .18
We also performed t-tests to compare directly the changes in medication usage
between treatment and control clusters. As shown in Table 5 and graphically in Figure 4
below, there were statistically signicant increases in medication usage between the baseline
and post-treatment periods (p < :001) across both treatment and control clusters, but we
found no signicant dierences in medication usage between treatment and control clusters
either at baseline or post-treatment. In other words, reported medication usage did increase
signicantly over the period of the study, but our data do not suggest that this increase
29Figure 4: Increases in Medication Usage for Individuals with Chronic Conditions
Percent Increase in Number of Individuals Taking at Least One Medication for a
Chronic Condition Over Period of Experiment (with 95% Confidence Interval)
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occurred as a result of Seguro Popular. In the following section, we discuss some possible
explanations for this, as well as our other ndings.
0.7 Discussion
In the beginning of this paper, we noted that one of the core aims of Seguro Popular was
to improve the availability of medications to individuals who previously had not been able
to access or aord them, often due to a lack in formal insurance. Meeting this need hinged
on a process of state institutions' purchasing and distribution of medications and other
supplies. The idea behind Seguro Popular in this regard was, in theory, quite simple. Infor-
mation from the demand side regarding medication needs had to be transmitted eectively
to the level at which supply decisions would be made (in this case, the state and national
30level). A process of pharmaceutical procurement would unfold, and then medications would
be distributed back to local health clinics, where they would be made available to the public.
The system of indicating needs under Seguro Popular was the enrollment of res-
idents of a health cluster in the program. Eligible individuals could aliate with Seguro
Popular, and in turn their aliation made the health cluster eligible for additional medi-
cations and other resources, as long as that cluster's facility was SP aliated. Needs were
to be evaluated at the state level, and states could purchase pharmaceuticals through the
process laid out previously, subject to the constraints of the Law of Acquisitions, Leasing,
and Services of the Public Sector. The pharmaceuticals would then be sent to individual
local health facilities, where aliated members of Seguro Popular would have access to the
medications at no out-of-pocket cost. In theory, then, enrolling residents in a health clus-
ter, or demonstrating demands to be met, should have resulted in additional medication
availability at corresponding health facilities. In turn, we would expect an increase in med-
ication usage in the areas with high enrollment rates and increased availability of medication.
In practice, though, our data call into question the extent to which this process
actually unfolded. The rst step of the process does seem to have been at least partially
successful, as enrollment rates in SP-aliated clusters were highly correlated with increases
in medication stocks to those clusters. As noted earlier, this relationship was not observed
in control clusters because they were not eligible for SP-funded medications.
The second key relationship we considered was that between changes in med-
ication availability and changes in medication usage among residents of a health cluster.
Our analysis resulted in two key ndings. First, there were highly signicant increases in
medication usage over the period of observation for both treatment and control clusters.
31Second, there were not statistically signicant dierences in rates of medication usage be-
tween treatment and control clusters either at baseline or post-treatment. So, signicant
increases in medication usage did occur, but they occurred at approximately the same rate
in both control and treatment clusters. This nding is contrary to our expectation that
increased medication availability would correlate positively with increased medication usage
in a health cluster.
Our ndings concerning the relationship between enrollment rates and medica-
tion availability should be considered with an important caveat, which is whether a one-time
observation of medication stock is a strong enough indicator of the availability of medication
to that health cluster. One could argue, on one hand, that because not all facilities were
surveyed on the same day of the week or the same time of the month, they could have been
surveyed at dierent points in the medication distribution cycle. Nonetheless, such a critique
is dissatisfying, because there was no particular bias in the order in which the medication
supplies were evaluated. Thus, although surveying at dierent phases of the distribution
cycle may have contributed to volatility of data, and thus made our error margins larger
than they would have been otherwise, there is not a reason to believe that this surveying
process altered the observed eect.
The second major nding in this study was that medication usage did increase
signicantly over the period of the study, but these increases occurred at very similar rates
in control and treatment facilities, and were not signicantly associated with changes in
medication availability. In explaining this nding, two considerations seem important. First,
because individuals in control clusters who chose to aliate with Seguro Popular were forced
to travel to treatment clusters to receive SP medications, these individuals, when surveyed at
the household level, would result in reports of increased medication usage in control clusters,
32even though the medications were actually coming from treatment facilities. Thus, the way
in which the program was implemented encouraged the dispersion of medications across clus-
ters and thus the muting of any correlation between medication stock and usage. Because
the percent increases to medication stock were very high, this could reasonably explain the
increase in usage in treatment and control clusters.
A second factor could also provide leverage into signicant usage increases over
the period of study. In reference to medication shortages and costs in Mexico, there have
been intense political and regulatory battles over the past 15 years in which pharmaceutical
companies fought for the rights to distribute cheap generic alternatives to prescription drugs
(Hayden, 2007). Although the specics of this debate, as well as its implications concerning
the role of the public sector in health provision, are beyond the scope of the paper, it is
important to make note of it nonetheless, because the proliferation of low-cost pharmacies
which distribute generic brands of many of the same types of medications available through
Seguro Popular was peaking just as our evaluation of the program was taking place. A
clear example of this type of chain would be Dr. Simi's Farmacias Similares, which were
increasing signicantly in reach and popularity during the mid-2000s. With a slogan of \The
Same But Cheaper!" in the face of medication shortages and escalating costs, it is easy to
understand the draw to such a pharmaceutical chain and its products. When individuals in
need of care have no certain expectation of a Seguro Popular facility being staed, stocked,
or conveniently located, many turn to local pharmacies which provide a quick and inexpen-
sive alternative.
In light of our ndings and the caveats discussed here, it is important to revisit
how our study ts within a framework of institutional analysis. As demonstrated in the
data on enrollment rates, there were signicant dierences in rates of enrollment even across
33treatment clusters in the study. Some states, most notably Mexico State, were far more
eective in enrolling individuals in Seguro Popular than were other states. As a result of
these dierences in enrollment rates, some states received more publicly funded medication
than did others.
We also noted in our discussion of the medication purchasing process that states
had signicant discretion in calculating medication needs, purchasing, and distributing medi-
cation needs to health facilities. In practice, many Mexicans report being denied medication
at public facilities because of shortages or because health workers decided to ration their
medications to patients they felt had more urgent needs. Thus, both at the stage of the
enrollment process in which eective marketing campaigns and/or pressure could be used to
enroll individuals in SP for the purpose of obtaining additional funding, and in the process
of medication purchasing and distribution, during which state purchasing units and eventu-
ally health facilities have signicant discretion in what types of medications are sent where
and to whom they are given, there is room for individuals or groups to execute SP rules
in accordance with their own goals. In other words, it should be unsurprising that we see
dierences in execution among states, since there is signicant room for exibility in the
implementation of SP policy.
In the Background section of this paper we noted that political science and wel-
fare state scholarship has largely left the topic of health reform to economists and public
policy specialists. But the ndings here should make very clear that the way in which health
policies are executed hinges on the performance of state institutions and the implementa-
tion decisions of those running them. For this reason political science scholars would do
well to consider not just the politics of health policy implementation but also the politics of
health policy execution in future work. Mexico's Seguro Popular, as well as universal health
34programs in Latin America and elsewhere, oer valuable material as of yet understudied by
political scientists.
35Part III
Paper II: Social Spending in Brazil
36The role of political partisanship is at the heart of government and policy and,
consequently, of great importance to political science. To what extent are government poli-
cies a result of exogenous and often uncontrollable factors, and to what extent are they a
result of the beliefs and biases of the individuals and coalitions which govern? Even within
the narrowed scope of questions related to political economy, this question has been asked to
investigate the motivations for government policies on items such as trade, regulatory policy,
and social spending. Whether the preferences of governments have a meaningful impact
on the economic policy direction of their countries oers insight into the extent to which
development outcomes can be explained by structural changes which occur independently
from shifts in governance.
In this paper, the question of partisanship is raised with regard to social spend-
ing, and, more specically, spending on health care. Do some governments choose to allocate
more of their budget to meeting health care needs? Or can health care spending be better
explained by factors such as level of economic development and urbanization? The case
study presented here looks at Brazil during the late 1990s and 2000s in an eort to under-
stand the determinants of health care spending in Brazilian municipalities.
While the primary question of this study is the role of partisanship in health
spending, a second and related question concerns the potential mitigating eect of health
reforms which occurred in Brazil during this period. During the 1990s and 2000s, Brazil
underwent a piecemeal process of scal centralization. Concurrent with the process of cen-
tralization was a process of decentralization for administering health services. In order to
facilitate this administration of services, a series of laws was passed mandating automatic
transfers of funds specically marked for health expenditures. Part of the motivation for the
health reform process was a desire to reduce inequities in social welfare spending across mu-
37nicipalities. By incentivizing levels and types of expenditures, reformers hoped to generate
a system in which municipalities chose to spend allocated health funds from the government
rather than establish their own funding systems. Their hope was that such a system of
automatic transfers would generate greater equality and standardization in health spending
across municipalities.
The change in funding structure for health has potentially important implications
for the role of political partisanship in social welfare spending. Because the reform process
created incentives for certain levels of health spending and certain types of expenditures, as
well as automatic mechanisms for funding transfers from the national to municipal levels,
there was potential for dierences in the nature of expenditures across municipalities to be
muted over time. If partisanship eects on health spending at the subnational level in Brazil
were signicant prior to the reform period, they would be expected to decrease between the
rst serious attempts at integrating municipalities into the new scal system in the mid-
1990s and the approximate end of integration in the mid-2000s.
In examining both the role of partisanship and the potentially mitigating eect
of the health reform process, we nd that there does appear to be a signicant partisan-
ship eect by which left-leaning governments spend more of their budget on health than
others. This eect is present prior to the reform process unfolding, and there is not clear
evidence that it dissipates over the period of the study. In other words, to the extent that
one of the goals of the reform process was to depoliticize social welfare spending, it appears
to have been unsuccessful. Notably, though, there is strong evidence that health spending
did increase signicantly over the period of the reform, which was another aim of the process.
The role of partisanship in health spending in Brazilian municipalities, and the
38failure of the reform process to mitigate this eect, has important implications both for
health in Brazil and for the potential of similar reform processes elsewhere. Scholars on
political partisanship, as will be discussed below, have often come to the conclusion that
partisanship does not have an important eect on policy outcomes. The evidence in this
paper strongly refutes this idea in the realm of health spending. Furthermore, while the suc-
cess of the reform in increasing expenditure level is clear, the success in muting dierences
between municipalities is less obvious. If partisan eects on health spending did not change
as a result of the reform process, then the successful achievement of the aims of the reform
process seems, at the very least, ambiguous. If politics does indeed have an important role
in health care spending, and Brazil's reform process was unable to change that role signi-
cantly, future reformers will need to re-evaluate strategies for ensuring quality public service
provision independent of government ideology.
0.1 Background
The relationship between partisanship and policy outcomes has received consideration
in numerous aspects of political economy, with very dierent conclusions. Scholars have
studied the role of partisanship on policies such as trade (Milner and Judkins, 2004), regula-
tory policy (Murillo, 2002), the welfare state (Iversen, 2001; Piersen, 1996; Allan & Scruggs,
2004), and inequality (Rueda, 2008), among other topics. Some scholars have theorized that
partisanship should play an important role in determining economic policy preferences. For
example, Boix (1998) argues that left-wing and conservative parties have dierent prefer-
ences for policies to increase eciency in economic markets. Studies of OECD countries (Hall
1989, eg.) suggested that partisanship was an important determinant of Keynesian economic
policies, with left-leaning governments preferring increased state intervention in the economy.
39Notably, many accounts of the role of partisanship on the welfare state focus on
the importance of left-leaning parties for the expansion of the welfare state (Hicks, 1999;
Garrett, 1998; Korpi, 1989) but since the 1970s numerous studies have found little evidence
for this eect (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Ross, 2000). An important question, raised by
Pierson and Murillo among others, is whether economic pressures such as capital crises and
globalization, might lead to economic policy convergence between left parties and parties of
right or centrist ideologies. Kingstone and Young (2009) looked at the question of economic
policy convergence in the face of rising left governments in Latin America, and concluded
that there were not discernible dierences in policies between these governments and others.
On the other hand, studies such as Milner and Judkins (2004) and Allan and Scruggs (2004)
suggest that partisanship does continue to be an important determinant of policy outcomes.
Finally, studies such as Murillo (2002) suggest that while there may be policy convergence,
partisanship matters in aspects of the implementation of widely accepted policies such as
privatization.
This study focuses in on one particular aspect of the welfare state, which is
spending allocated to public health. Whereas the role of partisanship on the overall welfare
state has gotten signicant scholarly attention, there is very little literature which evaluates
the role of partisanship on health spending in particular. One exception to this is Huber,
Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) a cross-national study in Latin America which suggests that
regime type, partisanship, economic pressures, and civil society may play a role in deter-
mining levels of both health and education spending. However, to my knowledge, all studies
of the determinants of health spending (Newhouse, 1977; Hitiris & Posnett, 1992; Potrafke,
2010, eg.) have been performed at the cross-national level, and most do not test political
partisanship as a spending determinant.
40The question of political partisanship and health spending has important im-
plications for both political science and public health. If partisanship matters in health
spending, then theories of policy convergence on welfare state preferences are called into
question. Particularly with the recent focus on left governments in Latin America, as well as
the continued importances of meeting basic health needs in an ecient way, the relationship
between political beliefs and health spending is crucial and understudied, particularly at
the subnational level. This question matters in the eld of public health as well, because
the basic design of ecient health systems must consider the political constraints of service
delivery. If governments have dierent preferences and/or execute dierent health policies,
this must be taken into consideration in designing a health system.
This paper approaches the question of partisanship and health spending at the
municipal level with data from Brazilian municipalities in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
This was a period of major reforms to the health care system, in which one of the primary
goals of reform was to mitigate health inequities across municipalities. To this end, it is
helpful to understand a bit more about the reform process.
0.1.1 Origins of Health Reform
Much of the impetus for change to the structure of the health system in Brazil came from
a civil society movement which began under Brazil's military regime (1964-85) and pushed
for expanded health coverage. During the military regime, Brazil experienced growth rates
reaching 10% GDP growth per year, earning the period the title of \The Brazilian Mira-
cle". However, this growth occurred in tandem with rising levels of inequality, creating a
foundation for progressive civil society movements focused on social services reform. Progres-
41sive movements for both health and education reform strengthened support during this time.
The civil society movement focused on health reform was known as the sanitarista
movement. Although it did not establish a core group of proponents until the late 1970s,
when it increasingly gained the support of medical professionals, local health authorities, and
left-wing health experts, the sanitarista movement had initially begun under the left-leaning
presidency of Jo~ ao Goulart, a government which ultimately fell prey to military rule in 1964.
At its core, the sanitarista movement aimed to redress some of the social inequities that
had become increasingly apparent during the period of military rule. The movement wanted
greater health spending on preventative care, a less signicant role for the private sector in
health care, and increased attention and resources to be directed toward urban and rural
poor. The movement also wanted a greater role for municipalities in the implementation of
health care, believing that this would contribute to better care in remote rural areas (Min-
ist erio da Sa ude, 1992 [1963]; Conselho Nacional de Secret arios de Sa ude [CONASS], 2007;
Falleti, 2010). Much of the drive for these reforms was rooted in the structure of the health
system in Brazil prior to the 1980s, as well as changes to services and scal resources in the
1970s and 1980s.
0.1.2 The Brazilian Health Care System Under Military Gover-
nance
The health care system in Brazil during the military period consisted of three dis-
tinct components: a public contracting system, a public integrated system, and a voluntary
contracting system (Fleury, 2000). The public contracting system, or social security com-
ponent of the health system, was nanced by salary-based contributions from formal sector
42employers and employees. Formal sector workers could then receive health services either
at designated social security hospitals or through private providers with whom the social
security administration contracted. Prior to 1977, the health and pension sectors of social
security were integrated into one institute, the National Institute of Social Insurance (INPS,
Instituto Nacional de Previd^ encia Social). In 1977, the health and pension sectors were sep-
arated into distinct bodies, and the National Institute of Medical Care and Social Security
(INAMPS, or Instituto Nacional de Assist^ encia M edica da Previd^ encia Social), took over
health functions of social security and became the primary agency of the public contracting
system (Fleury, 2000).
In many ways, the functioning of INAMPS and the resulting ineciencies mirror
current debates on health care structuring. INAMPS was based on a fee-for-service model
in which the administration paid providers to oer health care to social security benecia-
ries. Because there were no limits on service provision and little supervision or clarity about
health objectives, health care provision was often costly and inecient. There were also
mutually benecial \special" relationships between INAMPS and the association of private
hospitals, Brazilian Federation of Hospitals (FBH, or Federa c~ ao Brasileira de Hospitais), to
provide specialty services (Fleury, 2000). Relative to for-prot private providers, state and
municipal facilities, public universities, and nonprot institutions were not signicant health
services providers for INAMPS.
The second component of the health system during this time, the public inte-
grated system, was surprisingly distinct from the social security component. Whereas the
public contracting system was nanced by formal employment sector contributions, the pub-
lic integrated system was nanced through general taxation. The Ministry of Health was
specically responsible for services provided through this part of the system. Although the
43aim of the public integrated system was to provide quality preventative care for those unin-
sured through the formal sector, the Ministry of Health faced serious scal and organizational
constraints.
The nal component of the health system, the voluntary contracting system, was
small relative to the other two. It involved medical groups contracted privately by businesses
to provide services to their employees and was based on a fee-for-service model to outpatient
providers. Figure 5 outlines the relationships between providers, payers, and government in
the Brazilian health system during the 1970s.
There were two important shifts during the 1970s and 1980s that strained the
Brazilian health system and made its inequitable structuring a more salient issue. The rst
was the extension of health coverage to new individuals, which increased demands on the
health system. In particular, in 1974, emergency care was extended to the whole population.
As elsewhere, Brazilians in need of health care services who only had emergency coverage
used curative hospital services rather than primary preventative care. The new demand
resulting from the extension of emergency care to the entire population was covered mainly
by private hospitals, thus deepening the divide between the share of services provided by the
public and private sectors.
The second important change that occurred during this period was the debt crisis.
The large expenditure cuts associated with the debt crisis forced INAMPS to reduce the fee
schedule for contracted providers providing services to formal sector workers. In addition, tax
revenue declined, resulting in increasingly scarce resources for the Ministry of Health. This
particular combination was problematic, because one of the ways that the private providers
with which INAMPS contracted tried to maintain revenue levels was by becoming increas-
44Figure 5: Structure of the Brazilian Health Care System in the 1970s (Figure from Fleury
(2000))
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ingly selective about the patients, and cases, that they treated. Thus, although in theory new
individuals were gaining emergency coverage through private providers, in practice many of
these new patients were rerouted to public sector providers. Given declining tax revenues
and the scal strain faced by the Ministry of Health, many of the individuals who were
supposed to receive emergency care ended up with either low-quality or non-existent care in
practice.
450.1.3 The Sanitarista Movement
The organization of the Brazilian health care system under the military regime, as well
as the abovementioned changes in the 1970s and 1980s, helped to generate broader support
for reform of the health care system and, in turn, the sanitarista movement. The sanitarista
movement took issue with several aspects of the structure of the health system in Brazil
under the military regime. First, the sanitarista movement felt that the separation of the
health care system into a Ministry of Social Security (INAMPS) and a Ministry of Health
favored private medical associations and business interests at the expense of the general
population. It thus sought an integration of the social security system with the preventative
health services of the Ministry of Health. The sanitarista movement's pursuit of a united
health system focused on public services was based on the calculation that redistributing re-
sources from private contractors to the public health system would result in a better quality
of services available to the general population.
More generally, but relatedly, the sanitarista movement hoped to unite the role
of preventative and curative care, and shift the focus of public resources in the direction
of preventative care. The military's increasingly strong relationship with private providers,
and particularly with Brazil's association of private hospitals, had led to abuse of the fee-
for-service model, and primary care resources had suered as a result. One of the important
steps in the direction of preventative care occurred in 1976, when a group of sanitaristas
from the government thinktank IPEA (Instituto de Planejamento Econ^ omico e Social) and
the MOH designed an action plan, the Program of Internalization of Health and Sanitary
Actions (PIASS, or Programa de Interioriza c~ ao das A c~ oes de Sa ude e Saneamento) that
would put in place a network of sanitary stations in low density areas (Tanaka et al., 1992).
46These services required an integration of health provision at the local level, and also funding
that would be channeled from INAMPS. In addition to increasing resources for preventative
care to poor municipalities PIASS was an important milestone for the sanitarista movement
in shifting health care decision-making and execution to the municipal level.
The decentralization of responsibilities for the execution of health care to the mu-
nicipal level was an important goal of the sanitaristas. Under the previous system, much of
the policymaking and planning had occurred at the national level. For the sanitaristas, this
centralization was problematic because national and state level oces often did not reach
remote municipalities, making delivery at the municipal level dicult. Furthermore, the
centralization of the health care decision-making process often favored more urban and af-
uent areas at the expense of poorer rural municipalities (Minist erio da Sa ude, 1992 [1963];
CONASS, 2007). As a result, municipalities in the Northeast and in Minas Gerais often
received fewer and inadequate resources for public health services.
0.1.4 Health Reform Institutionalized: The 1988 Constitution
After Brazil democratized in 1985, health reformers had an opportunity to incorporate
many of the structural changes to the health system that they had been seeking into the
country's new constitution. Brazil's 1988 Constitution made great advances in both the def-
inition of health care as a right and as an obligation of the state as well as providing a legal
grounds for the restructuring of the health care system. Conceptually, the Constitution rec-
ognized health as a universal right of citizenship, and it gave the government a responsibility
for providing \universal and equal access to actions and services for its promotion, protection,
and recovery" (1988 Constitution, Chapter 2, Article 196). This was the strongest statement
of the government's obligation for providing health care services to the population to that
47point. Beyond the recognition of the government's role in health care, the 1988 Constitution
also set forth a series of rules for the creation of a unied system, thus merging the previously
distinct social security system and Ministry of Health. In merging the components of the
health system, the government was required to give priority to preventative care measures,
and prioritization decisions were to be based on the epidemiological prole of the population.
The 1988 Constitution also redistributed responsibilities for health care between
the levels of government. Whereas scal responsibilities were primarily the role of the na-
tional government, provision of services was to become primarily the responsibility of munic-
ipalities, thus achieving one of the principal aims of the sanitarista movement. Furthermore,
to increase social participation in the health system, health councils would be created at the
federal, state, and municipal levels. These health councils, composed of system users, pro-
fessionals, and managers, were to play an essential role in both developing and implementing
policies (Fleury, 2000). The redistribution of responsibilities between levels of government
and the creation of health councils were critical steps toward achieving decentralization.
Financing for the system would come from tax collection, social contributions, and
employer and employee payroll contributions. Article 198 set aside the specic tax revenue to
be used for the new integrated health system, and established that there would be minimum
percentages of proceeds and revenue required to be used toward public health services. This
was a very important step toward meeting the aims of the reform movement, as it both set a
minimum threshold for expenditures, and, in so doing, created the potential for closing the
gap between higher-spending municipalities and lower-spending municipalities.
The 1988 Constitution also set the foundation for future laws in the 1990s which
would establish both specic percentages to be used toward health spending and the exact
48levels of contributions from national, state, and local government. Table 6 shows the per-
centages of health funding being spent at each level of government. There is a clear shift
over the period of study toward spending occurring at the municipal level. It is important
to keep in mind that although these expenditures were occurring at the municipal level, the
scal centralization of the process meant that most of the revenue was being collected at the
national level.
Table 6: Public Spending on Health (Percent at each Level, Data from Ipea)
Year Federal State Municipal
1985 67.0 23.4 9.6
1986 60.9 26.3 12.8
1987 63.9 24.6 11.5
1988 50.8 35.0 14.2
1989 54.1 33.5 12.4
1990 52.5 32.8 14.6
1991 52.3 29.8 18.1
1992 70.1 17.0 12.9
1993 | | |
1994 56.5 24.8 18.7
1995 57.2 21.5 21.3
1996 45.7 19.5 34.8
0.1.5 Reform Implementation: The Brazilian Health Care System
During the 1990s
The implementation of health reform provisions included in the 1988 Constitution re-
quired additional health laws which needed to be passed through ordinary legislation. Both
the drafting of the 1988 constitutional health reforms and subsequent health laws were facil-
itated politically by the importance of center-left politicians to Sarney (1985-9)'s governing
coalition (Arretche, 2004). In the nal year of the Sarney administration the Health Ministry
49drafted a National Health Law, which was eventually implemented in 1990 as two separate
laws, 8080/90 and 8142/90. There were two critical victories for health reformers embedded
in these laws. First, a deadline for the closure of INAMPS was established. The Ministry of
Health would take over full responsibility for preventative and curative health services, and
these services would be provided through the Unied National Health System (SUS, or Sis-
tema  Unico de Sa ude). This was an important victory for reformers with respect to the aim
of equalizing services across groups and regions. Because previous service provision between
INAMPS and the MOH had diered signicantly, the integration of these institutions had
the potential to decrease dierences in access and quality across municipalities.
The second important achievement of the National Health Laws was the estab-
lishment of obligatory transfers from the MOH to municipalities. In this way, municipalities
gained control over the management of local health services provision, but they would re-
ceive regular, automatic funding from the national level. This was an important achievement
because automatic transfers from the national level meant that, at least in theory, minimum
expenditure thresholds would be established, and municipalities which had spent less in the
past due to partisanship, resource constraints, or other considerations would now be ex-
pected to meet a standardized minimum. Although the automatic transfers were themselves
a victory for reformers, the specics of the transfers were less clear, particularly on the is-
sue of to whom specically the transfers would be made, acceptable uses, and evaluation of
transfer fund use (Arretche, 2004).
0.1.6 Current Structure of the Health Care System
In many ways, the present structure of the the Brazilian health care system is a reec-
tion of the goals of the sanitarista movement and the subsequent reform process stemming
50from the 1988 Constitution. The Brazilian health system can be divided into two compo-
nents: the Unied Health System (SUS, or Sistema  Unico de Sa ude) and the supplemental
medical system. According to the 1988 Constitution, the SUS comprises all services pro-
vided either public health personnel or private personnel under public contract. The SUS
also covers services under all three levels of government.
Figure 6: Structure of the Brazilian Health Care System in the 1990s (Figure from Fleury
(2000))
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51The nancing of the system has changed quite substantially, both through the
Constitution and Basic Operational Norms and through subsequent reforms. One method
of nancing is the direct automatic transfers discussed earlier. These transfers were autho-
rized at an amount of approximately US $1.15 per year for each resident of a municipality
from the federal government to the municipal government in December 1997 (Lobato, 2000).
This automatic level of funding was designed to redistribute resources between municipalities
based on need rather than socioeconomic or other factors. The other method of nancing
is through transfers to providers for services. This second method, a fee-for-service model,
more closely resembles the previous system, whereas the direct municipal transfers, with
accordant exibility in expenditure decisions, reects the motivations of the reform process.
The reforms and nancing changes originally proposed in the Constitution and
later claried as part of the Health Laws and Operational Norms continued to be imple-
mented in stages throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, with the process largely com-
plete by 2005. Our expectation, then, would be that any eects of the reform process on
health spending should be observable with data through the mid-2000s.
0.2 Hypotheses
In this paper, we have two primary hypotheses related to the eect of partisanship on
health spending. Our rst hypothesis is that left parties will spend more on health when
controlling for relevant factors. We dene a left party as a party that has, broadly, a commit-
ment to poverty alleviation and social welfare spending, as well as to some degree of income
redistribution. In particular, parties which aim to improve basic public services and guar-
antee a minimum threshold of social security and career opportunity to citizens regardless
52of background or socioeconomic status are generally considered to be left-leaning parties.
Our specic codings for parties in Brazil are included in the Data section of this paper.
Because we have characterized left parties as parties which advocate for social spending and
some level of wealth redistribution, we anticipate greater public spending on health services
in districts with either a mayor from a left party or a left majority in the municipal legislature.
Although there has not been research on the determinants of health care spending
at the municipal level, a signicant number of cross-national studies have been done (New-
house, 1977; Hitiris & Posnett, 1992; Herwartz & Theilen, 2000; Potrafke, 2010). These
studies have pointed to the importance of GDP per capita, public expenditure levels, and
the age structure of a population as important determinants of health spending. Other gen-
eral studies (Huber, Mustillo, & Stephens, 2008) on social welfare spending, particularly in
Latin America, have suggested that regime type, partisanship, economic pressures, and civil
society may play a role in determining levels of social spending.
Beginning with Newhouse (1977) and Kleinman (1974), scholars have found a con-
sistent relationship between national GDP per capita and health care expenditure, a nding
which suggests that health care consumption might be thought of as a luxury good, though
others have disagreed (Parkin et al., 1987), calling it a necessary good, and still others have
found it to be some combination of the two (Getzen, 2000). Public health research has moved
in the direction of treating health spending as a combination of the two, with a focus on how
to optimize the quantity and quality of services provided by measures of cost-eectiveness.
The age structure has also been an important determinant of health spending
in previous studies, with an increase in the percentage of the population aged 65 or older
correlating with increased health spending (Di Matteo & Di Matteo, 1998). This spending
53is related both to acute and to long term care (de Meijer et al., 2011); seniors are expected
to have developed more chronic conditions as they age, many of which require ongoing treat-
ment and medication, and the danger of an acute health crisis for an older individual is
higher as well. In considering the eect of age on health spending it is particularly impor-
tant to control for socioeconomic status, as wealthier populations tend also to have an older
population structure due to demographic and epidemiological transitions.
The second hypothesis related to partisanship and health spending is that the
partisanship eect of left mayors and parties in the legislature should decrease over time.
The scal centralization process in Brazil was begun in the hopes of reducing inequities in
spending across regions and municipalities and guaranteeing that a certain minimum per-
centage of the municipal budget would be spent on health. Because the latter stages of the
reform process involved municipalities receiving automatic earmarked transfers for health
spending from the central government, two possible eects might be observed.
First, health spending could be expected to become less dependent on the governments
in power at the municipal level. Because funds are automatically transferred to them and
cannot be used for purposes other than health care, minimum health spending levels should
be protected. Although one might argue, and rightfully so, that municipalities could choose
to raise revenue for health care to supplement national funds, there have been signicant
practical and political obstacles to doing so. From a practical standpoint, setting up addi-
tional administrative oversight to allocate health funds which are relatively less important
given the federal contributions imposes a heavy cost at the municipal level. From a political
perspective, attempting to generate additional revenue for health in the presence of very
public earmarked transfers from the federal government is challenging. Thus, although there
are potential ways for dierences to persist in the face of reform, there is reason to believe
54that partisanship should become less important through the reform process. We therefore
anticipate that a partisanship eect will be strongest at the early stages of implementing
reform in the 1990s, and will weaken toward the end of the reform period in the mid-2000s.
The second possible eect of the automatic transfer system relates to the system's
emphasis on redistribution, or reallocating funds to poorer areas. Because part of the mo-
tivation for the reform was to ensure adequate health service provision across regions, and
redistributive mechanisms were set up accordingly, we might expect that over the period of
reform municipalities with lower economic output spend disproportionately high amounts of
their budget on health care.
0.3 Data
Because the scal centralization of health funding occurred during the latter years of
the 1990s and into the early 2000s, we chose to look at data from 1997-2005 in an eort
to capture changing partisan eects throughout the centralization process. Municipal level
spending on health is available through the Brazilian government's database Ipeadata. Our
dependent variable was municipal spending on health and sanitation as a percentage of total
budget spending.
Our primary independent variable of interest was partisanship. We obtained data
on municipal electoral outcomes from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. We relied on three dif-
ferent sources (Mainwaring, 1999; Hagopian, 2010; Hagopian & Power, 2011) for classifying
partisan orientation of political parties in Brazil in an eort to capture shifts in orientation
over time as well as account for dierences between classication systems. Whereas Main-
55waring (1999) uses a ve-bin coding system, Hagopian (2010) and Hagopian & Power (2011)
use three bins. Figures 7 and 8 show the codings to which we adhered for each model.
Figure 7: Codings from Mainwaring (1999)
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Figure 8: Codings from Comparative Politics Today: Hagopian (2010) and Hagopian and
Power (2011)
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56We chose three dierent ways to measure partisanship in a municipality. Two
of these were related to the partisan orientation of the legislature, and one concerned the
partisan orientation of the mayor. First, we created a variable coded for the partisan ori-
entation held by the majority in the legislature. If more than 50% of municipal legislative
seats were held by legislators from parties classied as either left or center left, we coded the
majority variable as -1. If the majority was held by right or center right parties, we coded
the majority variable as 1. If there was no partisan majority, or a majority was held by
center parties, the majority variable was coded as 0.
The second partisan variable that we created aggregated the partisan orientations
of all individual legislators. In the models using Mainwaring (1999)'s partisan codings, this
variable was created by multiplying -2 by the percentage of left parties in the legislature, -1
by the percentage of center left parties, 1 by percentage of center right parties, and 2 by per-
centage of right parties, and adding these values. In general, we found that the variables for
the majority in the legislature correlated strongly with the variable created by aggregating
the partisan position of individual legislatures. Finally, the third partisan variable simply
represented the partisan coding of the mayor.
We incorporated several control variables into our model. First, level of develop-
ment is widely considered (Anderson et al., 2000; Huber et al., 2004) to be an important
determinant of social spending. We considered two possible measures for development: Hu-
man Development Index, a development indicator designed by the UN Development Pro-
gram, and GDP per capita of municipalities (measured in 2000 reais per capita). Both of
these measures were available through Ipeadata.
Another control variable that we incorporated was the percentage of the popula-
57tion in a municipality under the age of 15. We controlled for the percentage under age 15
because scholars have shown health care costs to be higher for populations with large numbers
of children and adolescents in developing countries (Huber et al., 2004). This is primarily due
to health costs such as immunizations specic to children as well as the higher prevalence of
infectious diseases associated with early stages of the demographic and epidemiological tran-
sition in which youths comprise a greater percentage of the population. In contrast, older
populations are associated with higher expenditures on health in industrialized societies, as
non-communicable disease expenditures are relatively more important. Because percentages
of the population over the age of 64 and under the age of 15 are so highly correlated, we
have included only a variable for under 15 in accordance with previous work (Huber et al.,
2004). Our hypothesis was that a higher percentage of individuals under the age of 15 would
correlate with higher health care expenditures, as Brazil is still in the process of development.
We also hypothesized that scope of the health system would be an important
determinant of health spending. Specically, we hypothesized that the number of health
professionals in a municipality would aect health spending. We therefore incorporated a
control variable for the number of physicians per 1000 inhabitants into one of the models.
Finally, scholars have shown the level of industrialization to be an important determinant
of social spending. Thus, in accordance with Huber et al. (2008), we incorporated a control
variable for the percentage of individuals in a municipality living in an area classied as
urban, based on data from Ipea.
580.4 Analysis
An important initial glance at the data show that there is a clear trend in increased
municipal spending on health care. As shown in Figure 9, municipal health spending as
a percentage of budget spending shows consistent increase over the period of reform from
1997-2005. This trend suggests that the reform process was successful in increasing expen-
diture on health care, as well as decentralizing the expenditures to occur at the municipal
level. Thus, in at least one important aspect, Brazil's health reform must be considered a
success.
Figure 9: Municipal Spending over Time
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Beyond increasing expenditure levels, we were also interested in the relationship
between partisanship and expenditure. We decided to consider two primary models, one
59which used Human Development Index and the number of physicians per 1000 inhabitants,
and the second which used urbanization, percentage of the population under 15, and GDP
per capita as control variables, in accordance with Huber et al. (2008). We ran each model
with the primary independent variable as the partisan orientation of the legislature (ma-
jority and aggregated partisan orientation), on one hand, and the partisan orientation of
the mayor, on the other. Our dependent variable was municipal health spending as a per-
cent of total municipal budget spending, with the original spending gures in Brazilian reais.
We tried each model with the party codings presented by Mainwaring (1999), as well as
those presented by Comparative Politics Today. Because there was no signicant dierence
in the results derived from using Mainwaring (1999)'s codings and the Comparative Politics
Today codings, we have presented only the Mainwaring codings here for the sake of simplic-
ity. There was also no signicant dierence in results for dierent measures of partisanship,
so we have presented only the results for the majority variable here.
We ran regressions for our variables of interest for each of the years during our
period of observation, which correlated roughly with the period of implementation of health
spending reforms (1997-2005). As stated earlier, our expectation was that there would be
a partisan eect early on, but this eect would dissipate over time. We anticipated static
eects of urbanization, age, GDP, HDI, and physicians per 1000 residents.
In looking at the results in Tables 7 and 8, the rst important observation to note
is that there does seem to be a strong partisan eect for much of the period of observation,
and this eect is in the direction that we would expect. That is, when the majority shifts
toward the left (more negative), health spending as a percentage of total budget spending
increases. These results are signicant for most years in the study, and they are very simi-
60lar in both models. This is consistent with the hypothesis that left-leaning parties tend to
allocate more resources to health and sanitation when controlling for other factors.
Because the Worker's Party (PT) is large and left-leaning, there was the potential
for these results to reect the inuence of one party. For this reason, we decided to run
the same analysis in which we removed the PT from the dataset and reported majorities
and aggregated partisan scores as though the governments were functioning without any PT
members. Doing so did not change the observed eect, and it rarely changed the signicance
level. Thus, we concluded that our result could not be explained only in terms of the pres-
ence of the PT.
Concerning the second part of our hypothesis regarding partisanship, that parti-
san eects should dissipate over time, the evidence is much less clear. The partisan eect
that we observe appears to be consistent in both models for the years 1997-2004, indicating
that there is no clear mitigation of partisanship eects on spending as the health care reform
process unfolds. Because there is no observed partisanship eect in either model in 2005,
it is possible that a study continuing into the post-2005 period would observe a decrease
in partisanship. If this decrease in partisanship were to be observed, it would accord with
our hypothesis that partisan eects should decrease over time. Theoretically, though, such
a study is not consistent with the reform period, since much of the reform program was
complete by 2005.
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63As expected, urbanization correlates strongly with increased percentages of bud-
get spending on health, and this eect appears to be relatively consistent and signicant
over the years of the study. This is also the case with the variables for physicians per 1000
residents in the second model. Larger percentages of the population under age 15 also gener-
ally correlate with relatively greater health spending, although this eect does seem to drop
o in the 2000s. In general, however, all of these independent variables corresponded to our
theoretical expectations.
Also expected was the negative correlation between HDI and GDP, on one hand,
and the percentage of budget income spent on health and sanitation, on the other. The neg-
ative coecients in front of these variables suggest that as municipalities' GDP or HDI goes
up, health spending becomes a smaller percentage of budget spending. As discussed in the
Hypotheses section, this result makes sense, because there was a redistributive element to
the health reform process by which some of the funds collected from wealthier municipalities
were reallocated to poorer regions.
In brief, our results support the hypothesis that partisanship plays an important
role in determining health care expenditure. We nd that municipalities with left majori-
ties appear to spend a signicantly larger portion of their budget revenue on health and
sanitation than do other municipalities. A number of our other hypotheses are also borne
out by the data: urbanization, age structure, and scope of the health system all appear to
be important factors in determining health spending. The negative coecients on HDI and
GDP are likely due to the measurement of health spending as a percentage of total budget
expenditure rather than as an absolute value in Brazilian reais.
640.5 Conclusion
The health reform process which unfolded in Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s was the
culmination of a reform eort which began as early as the 1960s under military rule. Re-
formers observed the curative-focused, divided, high-cost health system and advocated for a
series of comprehensive reforms which eventually got incorporated into the 1988 Constitu-
tion and upon which the National Health Laws of the 1990s were based. One of the central
principles of these reforms was to reduce regional inequities and redistribute funds between
municipalities such that external factors such as partisanship would not signicantly aect
the quality of health care available at the municipal level.
In this paper, we have undertaken the rst study of health care spending in Brazil
at the municipal level in an eort to evaluate how successful these reforms were in mitigating
the role of partisanship in health care spending. In order to do so, we have examined mu-
nicipal level data on health and sanitation spending over the period of reform (1997-2005),
as well as data on level of development, age structure, and the scope of the health system.
Our major nding concerning partisanship is that municipalities with left-leaning majorities
in the legislature do appear to spend a larger percentage of their budget revenue on health
and sanitation than do other municipalities. Although we might have expected this eect to
become diluted over time due to the increasing incorporation of municipalities into the SUS
and the consequent redistribution of resources, this dilution is not evident from the data in
this study. Any conclusion regarding this hypothesis would require additional study.
Ultimately, the results presented here are important both to literature on politics
and social spending and to literature on health care reform. Previous studies relating politics
and partisanship to social spending have often focused on cross-national studies, necessarily
65relying on control variables for trade policy and regime type to allow for valid comparisons.
There have been signicantly fewer studies done at the subnational level, and we know of no
other study which examines health care spending at the municipal level in Brazil. Particu-
larly given the recent reform process, such a study is needed. Whereas previous studies have
often suggested that partisanship is most important in determining the nature of expenditure
and not the overall level of expenditure, our ndings suggest that partisanship may also be
important in explaining the portion of the budget allocated to health care.
This study is also useful for the literature on reform, because it suggests that
the reform process in Brazil probably did not achieve its aims completely, at least in terms
of mitigating subnational inequities. It also suggests, both qualitatively and quantitatively,
that reform processes unfold over long periods of time, and some of their eects may not be
observed until years after the theoretical completion of the process. In Brazil, reforms were
not made ocial until 3 decades after the impetus for change. After the ocial reforms,
change actually occurred in a very piecemeal, messy process over the 1990s and 2000s. As
shown in the discussion of dierent levels of municipal responsibility, the process continues
to unfold. Thus, future attempts at health care reform, in Brazil or elsewhere, should bear
in mind that the arc of reform is long, and likely much longer than anticipated.
In spite of the reservations expressed here regarding outcomes of the health reform
process in Brazil, it is important to note that this is often considered to be an exemplary
case of the implementation of universal health care in a developing country. Although ques-
tions and concerns remain, particularly regarding funding and the quality of services, many
more Brazilians have access to health care than previously, and the system providing these
services has undergone a massive restructuring in order to address health needs across the
country more equitably. This in itself is an important achievement, and a worthy aim for
66other countries considering reform.
67Part IV
Paper III: Quality of Health Care in
Brazil
680.1 Introduction
As one of the world's largest countries and with one of the most rapidly expanding
economies, Brazil features prominently, and rightfully so, in discussions of the direction of
the world economy. Although Brazil's economic potential draws signicant international
attention, less focus has been placed on its innovations in social service provision. Over the
past 30 years, Brazil has made impressive and wide-ranging changes to both education and
health care, with dramatic improvements in literacy, life expectancy, and mortality rates. In
this paper, I take a closer look at the development of Brazil's health care system over the
past three decades.
In considering Brazil's health care system, I am most interested in assessing the
quality of care the system provides, as perceived by patients themselves. I am dening
quality as patients' perceptions of the extent to which health care personnel and facilities
meet their needs and expectations. This denition of quality is focused on the patient's
experience itself, rather than long-term health care outcome indicators such as mortality,
or infrastructural variables such as the number of personnel or institutions. As discussed
below, I believe that this perceived experience component to health care is an important
intermediate variable between health system inputs, such as funding and personnel, and
health system outputs, such as mortality rates and disease prevalence.
This paper is organized as follows: rst, I provide some background on the Brazil-
ian health system and relevant periods of reform. Second, I discuss the theoretical under-
pinnings for my measurement of quality. Third, I present theoretical justication for the
individual and municipal level variables that I expect might be important in explaining dif-
ferentiation in quality across Brazilian municipalities. I then present my research design,
69followed by my results and analysis. In this section, I show that individual demographic
characteristics explain more variation in self-reported quality of care in Brazil than do mu-
nicipal level factors, and I discuss why this may be the case. The conclusion oers nal
thoughts and suggestions for how this research agenda might move forward.
0.2 The Brazilian Health Care System
The impetus for much of the current structure of the Brazilian health care system began
in the mid-1970s under military governance. Brazil was experiencing impressive levels of eco-
nomic growth (around 10% per year), but also rising levels of inequality. During this time, a
social movement which would come to be known as the movimento sanit aria emerged. The
movement coincided with and reinforced broader societal pressure for democratization, but
the sanitaristas were focused specically on health sector concerns. One concern was that
the federal division of health programs into a Ministry of Social Security (INAMPS) and
a Ministry of Health (MOH) provided unequal health care access to workers who were not
formal sector employees, as workers in this group were ineligible to receive services through
INAMPS. Another concern of the sanitaristas was that health nancing and delivery was
highly centralized. The federal system was seen as corrupt and ill-managed, and the methods
of nancing under INAMPS (direct payment and cost reimbursement to physicians), were
dicult to administer under a centralized system, particularly in a country as large and as
diuse as Brazil (Lewis & Medici, 1998). Finally, the proximate source of support for the
sanitaristas was the recession of 1982 and associated reductions in expenditures. In the face
of recession, INAMPS spending declined by more than 20% between 1980 and 1983, leading
to further worsening in service provision (Vianna et al., 1991). In short, by the early 1980s,
the problems of fragmented, centralized, and inequitable health care had come to a head,
70and sanitaristas had substantial support from diverse sections in society including middle
class populations, progressive professors, and trade unions.
The increasingly powerful movimento sanit aria was able to forge important ties
with government ocials and municipal ocers during the early 1980s. In 1980, both the
National Council of State Health Secretaries (CONASS) and the Council for the Admin-
istration of Preventative Medicine (CONASP), were formed (Paim et al., 2011; Lewis &
Medici, 1998). The new health task forces were charged with the creation of a unied health
system and the expansion of services to previously underserved populations. The creation of
the unied health system was to occur in three phases. First, under the Integrated Health
Activities (AIS) beginning in 1984, there were shifts toward increased outpatient care, more
ecient use of INAMPS facilities, and some decentralization. Second, INAMPS was con-
verted from a dual nancer/provider role to solely a nancing agency, access to INAMPS
funding was universalized, and INAMPS sta and facilities were transferred to state health
secretariats. These changes occurred during the 1988-89 period under the Unied and De-
centralized Health System (SUDS). The nal stage of the unied health system would occur
through the creation of the Single Health System, or SUS. In this stage, public responsibility
for health care would be transferred to the municipal level (Lewis & Medici, 1998).
Concurrent with these reforms were new conceptualizations of health as a uni-
versal right and a public responsibility. In 1986, the National Health Conference approved
health as a citizen's right. In Article 6 and Article 196 of the new democracy's 1988 Consti-
tution, health was formally recognized as a fundamental right and duty of the state. Many
of the changes of the 1988 Constitution had been in place in practice prior to its ratication,
but the 1988 Constitution formalized the evolution of health care in Brazil. Through the
reforms of the 1980s and additional regulation in the 1990s, permanent health councils were
71developed and currently exist at all three levels (national, state, municipal) of government,
with bodies addressing policy design, implementation and analysis. Councils have broad
representation from system users, providers, and workers, and strong connections to poli-
cymakers. The movimento sanit aria was thus highly successful in transforming grassroots
support into policy and institutional change.
In addition to health provision reform, the structure of health nancing also un-
derwent substantial change during the 1980s and 1990s. A few broad trends can be noted.
First, in accordance with eorts at decentralization, federal funds for health spending were
re-allocated away from the federal level and toward the state and particularly the municipal
levels. Second, private nancing of health care increased during the 1980s and 1990s, and by
1994 about one-fth of Brazilians held some form of private insurance (World Bank, 1994).
Finally, the public payment system underwent substantial change. In 1980, a commission
of experts introduced a prospective payment plan, known then as the Physician-Hospital
Service System of Social Security, or SAMHPS, and eventually as the Hospital Information
System of SUS, or SIH/SUS. The prospective payment plan provided xed reimbursement
for specic treatments based on a fee schedule set by the Ministry of Health, and based on
average hospital costs. One important aspect of the Brazilian health care system is that
the public and private sectors are highly integrated, and the public sector subcontracts to
the private sector frequently for the provision of services. This public subcontractor model
is unique in Latin America (Inter-American Development Bank [IADB], 1996) and raises
the expected issues of provision of unnecessary services and rising health costs. It further
complicates analyses of public and private provision of services, as will be discussed below.
720.3 Quality of Health Care in Brazil
In the discussion of changes to health institutions and nancing it is easy to lose sight
of the quality of care. Indeed, the \forgotten component" (World Bank, 1994) of health care
in Brazil is crucial both to patient experience and outcomes as well as ecient allocation of
human and nancial resources. One of the best-known past approaches to quality of health
care is that of Donadebian (1980), which disaggregates quality of care into three dimensions:
structure, process, and outcome. The structural dimension refers broadly to health person-
nel and facilities available for care, the process dimension refers to the actual execution of
care by the provider, and the outcome dimension refers to patients' changes in physical or
mental well-being, and could be measured by something such as a mortality rate. In this
paper, I am interested in the process dimension of quality in Brazil rather than the structure
or outcome. In part, this is because I want to distinguish between health system inputs and
health system outputs. I consider Donabedian's structural quality variables, such as size and
education of health care personnel, to be health system inputs. I am interested in explaining
variation in the outputs of the Brazilian health care system.
Given a focus on outputs, one could choose to focus on the process aspect of
quality or on the health outcome component. I am choosing to focus on the process dimen-
sion, which I rene below into what I will call an `experience' dimension, for two reasons.
First, the process dimension gives us a unique insight into how eective patients believe their
health care to be. If individuals go to the physician and feel that their needs are not met and
their questions are not answered, we could reasonably expect them to change their health
care usage pattern and insurance decisions. Thus, a focus on the process dimension of health
care allows us insight into health decision-making that an outcomes measure cannot. The
second reason that I focus on process and not on outcomes is that there is greater theoretical
73space between health system inputs and health outcomes than there is between inputs and
process. We could see a great impact on outcomes such as mortality rate in a municipality
in a given period due to a natural disaster or other similar occurrence which was not a direct
result of the health system. By narrowing the theoretical space between variables, we are
better able to understand the way in which eects unfold.
Though the case for measuring the process dimension of health care is strong, I
choose to rene it somewhat from Donabedian's denition. In Donabedian (1988), another
distinction, that between technical performance of the practitioner and interpersonal perfor-
mance of the practitioner, is suggested. Logically, one could interpret these as subdivisions
of the process dimension of health care. In this paper, I draw from Donabedian's work in
focusing on the interpersonal component of health care. That is, I am interested in the
process dimension of quality, but specically as it relates to the way in which a health care
provider interacts with a patient, and the patient's resulting perception of his or her expe-
rience. Because I am interested in the patient's overall experience, though, I am interested
in aspects of a clinic visit beyond just the interpersonal component of health care. For ex-
ample, I am interested in knowing how patients feel about the cleanliness and space of the
facilities in which they are treated. As my understanding of quality is more nuanced than
merely a measure of the `interpersonal' dimension of care, I will refer to it as the `experience'
component of health care here.
0.4 Theoretical Predictions
In this section, I draw on political science and public health literature to formulate
hypotheses about the source of variation in patients' self-reported quality of health care in
74Brazil.
0.4.1 Demographic Characteristics: Inequality in Health Care for
Dierent Populations
Numerous studies published in recent years have suggested the importance of demo-
graphic characteristics of individual patients for their self-reported quality of care and their
satisfaction with their physicians (Saha et al., 2003; Campbell et al., 2001; Feinstein, 1993).
In particular, these studies have analyzed the importance of socioeconomic status, race, age,
and gender in reporting of the quality of health care.
The relationship between socioeconomic status and health care has been studied
extensively over the past several decades, with scholars addressing the relationship between
income levels, on the one hand, and both health care outcomes (such as mortality rates and
prevalence of disease) and health care quality (often through patient self-reporting) on the
other. Kitagawa and Hauser (1973) and Silver (1973) demonstrated a strong correlation
between household income and mortality rate for individuals in most age categories. Other
studies, such as Campbell et al. (2001), have found that socioeconomic status of individuals
aects their self-reported quality of care. In the study performed by Campbell et al., indi-
viduals of lower socioeconomic status reported a lower quality of care on 2 of 13 dimensions
considered, although overall socioeconomic status accounted for a relatively small amount
of variability in the self-reported health care quality results.
Scholars (Kahn et al., 1999; Schneider et al., 2002; Virnig et al., 2002) have
also shown a consistent correlation between race and health care quality. In a London study,
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favorable assessments of their primary health care services while controlling for relevant other
factors. In an eort to understand what about the health care experience was contributing
to racial inequalities, Saha et al. (2003) examined specic aspects of the physician-patient
relationship through questions related to the clarity of communication and time spent in-
teracting. The authors concluded that non-White racial groups reported a lower quality of
interaction with physicians, and that this dierence in quality of interactions accounted in
some instances for the patients' overall satisfaction with their health care (Saha et al., 2003).
This literature suggests that minority racial groups may report lower quality of health care
services than individuals who are members of the predominant racial group. Unfortunately,
much of the literature on race and quality of health care relies on self-reported data without
correcting for individual bias in reporting. In the present study, I will consider the eects
of race while simultaneously controlling for individual reporting bias, as described in the
Research Design section of this paper.
Older patients have consistently reported more favorable assessments of health
care in prior studies (Phillips & Brooks, 1998; Baker, 1996; Cartwright & Anderson, 1981;
Campbell et al., 2001). Nonetheless, without correcting for individual reporting bias, it
is dicult to discern whether such results indicate that older patients are likely to receive
higher quality health services or whether older patients are less comfortable reporting un-
favorable outcomes. That is, elderly patients may have lower expectations for their health
care interactions.
Gender has been a less consistent predictor of primary health care quality assess-
ments than the other demographic characteristics discussed here. Campbell et al. (2001)
nd no signicant dierence between gender groups for assessment of primary care, for exam-
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quality of health care received. Bierman et al. (2007) nds that women are at an increased
risk of being prescribed potentially inappropriate medications, and Kaul et al. (2007) nds
that women presenting at emergency departments with coronary symptoms are less likely
to be admitted to the hospital than are men with similar symptoms. A prediction for the
role of gender in quality of health care assessments is complicated by potentially dierent
subjective rating systems for quality of care across genders. As with the studies relating race
and health care quality, this potential bias has largely been ignored in the literature.
Literature on demographic characteristics of patients indicates clearly the impor-
tance of these factors in health care quality reporting, as well as suggests the need to control
for individual reporting bias.
0.4.2 Party Aliations: Pork Barrel and Coordinated Govern-
ment
Political scientists have regularly dened the interests of politicians in terms of their
careers: as rational actors, politicians will act in ways which maximize their chances of re-
election (Geddes, 1994). In a democratic government, politicians earn re-election through the
electoral support of their constituents. Consequently, politicians have an incentive to pro-
vide goods and services to their district which will generate constituents' electoral support.
Depending on the nature of the political system, politicians will maximize their resources
and support in dierent ways. For example, federalist systems such as Brazil allocate more
resources to state and other sub-national governments than do non-federalist systems. As
a result, governors and mayors exercise greater control over resources in a federalist system
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is relevant to the political science literature on presidential coattails. Whereas a central-
ized system may allow lower-level politicians to benet electorally when a member of their
party is elected to the presidency, this eect may be seen more readily at the state level in a
federalist system. That is to say, we might expect that governors' coattails will be more bene-
cial to local governors' electoral results than would be presidential coattails (Samuels 2000).
The relationship between the party aliation of the governor and a mayor in a fed-
eralist system is important in at least two ways. The rst way in which it may be important
is through increased access to resources, which I will refer to as the pork barrel hypothesis.
As numerous scholars have indicated (Scheiner 2005, Desposato 2006), lower-level politicians
can benet from increased access to state resources when their political party aliation is
the same as the governor's. As Desposato (2006) argues, this access is important enough
in Brazil that legislators will switch parties frequently and on short notice in order to gain it.
A second hypothesis is that an alignment of party aliations between the mayor
and governor will result in better governance, regardless of increased access to resources. This
might be the case if same party aliation results in better coordination between government
at the state and municipal level. For instance, if a state governor knows that a particular
municipality is controlled by another legislator from his party, he may try to reduce the
bureaucratic obstacles to local projects. There may also be fewer jurisdictional disputes,
allowing a more straightforward and cohesive approach to local government. Both of these
considerations would lead us to believe that matching party aliations between mayors and
governors may result in better quality of state health care services, as perceived by patients.
780.4.3 Electoral Competitiveness: Better Institutional Performance
Treating politicians as rational actors who will respond to incentives also implies that
the strength of the opposition should matter for state performance. If politicians face external
competition or pressure, their re-election is more likely to depend on their ability to meet
public sector needs through institutional performance. Both Geddes (1994) and Grzymala-
Busse (2007) nd that a robust opposition is likely to generate better state performance,
with Geddes (1994)'s results specically derived from Brazil. Other studies (Padovano &
Ricciuti 2009) have made similar claims about the level of political competition and economic
performance.
0.4.4 Fiscal Capacity: Institutional Performance
In addition to the political characteristics of the municipalities in which the state health
facilities are located, it is useful to consider scal capabilities. Although the scal capacity
of a local government- that is to say, its ability to generate revenue as evidenced by the
percentage of GDP collected as taxes- can provide information about funding levels, I am
more interested in using scal capacity as a measure of institutional eectiveness.
Numerous scholars have argued for the role of strong states and stable institu-
tions in promoting development (Naim, 1994; Popov, 2001). In Latin America, however,
political scientists have consistently lamented the problem of weak states (Centeno, 1997;
O'Donnell, 1993; Geddes, 1994). One explanation for the persistence of weak states is based
on extension of Charles Tilly's scal-military model to Latin America. Tilly (1985) argues
that strong states in Europe resulted from the revenue-generating necessities of interstate
warfare. Centeno applies this logic to Latin America, noting that a relative lack of inter-
state warfare did not allow for creation of strong states in Latin America in the same way
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American states alleviated pressures to generate revenue through internal taxation. Thus,
in contrast to their European counterparts, many Latin American countries arrived to the
twentieth century lacking strong institutional foundations.
The failure to develop strong institutions early on may aect institutional per-
formance at a much later period. In path-dependent explanations of political institutions,
such as Pierson (2000) and Mahoney (2000), the failure to develop strong institutions at
an initial period implies increasing diculty in developing those strong institutions at later
points in time due to the increasing returns to retaining institutional infrastructure. This
argument nds empirical support in Latin America. With few exceptions, Latin American
countries still lack state capacity sucient to execute many basic civil tasks-legal rule, tax
collection, and adequate public services such as security. Often, there is great variation in
institutional performance across subnational regions. Because poor quality of institutions
might be expected to inuence social performance outcomes such as the quality of health
care, it is useful to use a measurement of institutional performance as an explanatory vari-
able for health care outcomes.
Lieberman (2003) discusses tax collection in Brazil from a historical institutional
perspective in emphasizing the stickiness of institutions over time and the way in which this
institutional durability inuences the actors who become involved in politics and the way
in which they dene their interests. He compares the historical development of tax institu-
tions in Brazil to those in South Africa. While both countries have undergone trajectories
of economic development and racial relations, Brazil has failed to develop eective scal
institutions on the level of South Africa. Lieberman points to the previously overlooked
idea of National Political Community (NPC), suggesting that the way in which groups of
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relationships with other groups and with the state, dictates the extent to which scal insti-
tutions will be implemented at a critical juncture. These scal institutions, if implemented,
can be expected to endure over time. The quality of these extractive scal institutions, or
scal capacity, is a reection of past cohesiveness and coordination of elite interests, and
inuences the future ability of governments to generate revenue. Thus, it is useful to think
of scal capacity of a measure of the state's ability to undertake actions eectively in the
public realm. To this end, we should expect that a region with high scal capacity will also
have higher quality of health care services, as perceived by patients.
0.4.5 Governance under the Workers' Party: Political Organiza-
tions and Ideology
In addition to considering alignment of parties at the municipal and state level, the
particular party in power at the municipal level may be important for perceived health care
quality outcomes. In particular, there are at least two reasons to believe that municipalities
governed by the left-leaning Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), or Workers' Party, should pro-
duce better health outcomes than municipalities governed by other parties.
The rst reason one might expect strong health care performance under the PT
is that the PT is noted for its grassroots organization and governance at the municipal level.
Numerous scholars (Samuels, 2006; Hunter, 2010; Abers, 2000; Branford & Kucinski 2003)
have noted the PT's roots in mass-based movements such as Christian base communities
(Comunidades eclesiales de base, or CEBs) and trade union activists in the 1970s. The PT's
birth out of labor strikes in the late 1970s, in the midst of harsh repression under military
governance, indicated the emergence of a practical party with strong ties to community and
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more than an average political party, and in many ways more closely resembles a social
movement...[It is] deeply involved with organizations ghting for social change throughout
the country...in many rural areas, there is literally no line between these social movements
and the party itself" (3).
In his analysis of Brazilian party systems, Scott Mainwaring (1999) notes that
a party's roots in society are an important component of the party's institutionalization.
Party roots in society lead voters to support a party consistently in a given election and over
time, decreasing the volatility of that party's electoral support. In a country notorious for
having weakly institutionalized catch-all parties without strong societal roots, the PT stands
out for its strong organizational structures, consistent supporters, and focus on municipal
governance. Given the decentralization of Brazil's health care system written into the 1988
Constitution which transferred many responsibilities for health care to the local level, one
might expect that the PT would outperform other parties in the perceptions of quality of
health care services provided.
The second reason that the PT may perform well in health care outcomes is
its ideological bent toward social sector reform, particularly with respect to education and
health care. Scholars (Castles, 1982; Hicks & Swank, 1982) have demonstrated that greater
control by left-leaning parties leads to greater social spending. The PT has been consistently
involved with social reform movements, and specically health reform movements, in Brazil.
As early as 1981, the PT was involved with a movement for improved health care which
eventually inuenced the creation of the SUS (Branford 2003). In the late 80s and early 90s,
PT mayors in Santos and Porto Alegre also introduced proposals for improved sanitation
and public health. Indeed, the PT's \outstanding success" in health care improvements was
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Under Telma, health centers known as policl nicas were set up to provide route health ser-
vices such as vaccinations.
As will be discussed in the following section, there is not a consensus that greater
health spending results in a higher quality of care, but the theoretical prediction that parties
such as the PT will emphasize aspects of social welfare such as health care, perhaps resulting
in higher quality ratings, is certainly worth considering.
0.4.6 Municipal Resources: Health Spending and Municipal Wealth
There is little consensus on the role of public nancing in improving health care out-
comes. Studies such as Anderson et al. (2000) and Cooper (2009) suggest that increased
health care spending may improve the quality of health care delivered. On the other hand,
studies such as Baicker and Chandra (2004) and Skinner et al. (2009) suggest that health
spending may be negatively correlated with quality outcomes, at least for Medicare patients.
These latter studies indicate that improvement in eciency of services is more important
than increasing spending for quality outcomes. Finally, some studies, such as a 1999 World
Bank assessment of spending and child mortality rates in the developing world, nd little
eect of public spending on health (measured by mortality rates) when controlling for other
factors. Or (2000) notes that such \contradictory results" in assessing the impact of health
expenditure on health outcomes can be attributed, at least in part, to variations in models
and indicators, as well as sparse research due to the diculty of obtaining comparable data
across regions or countries. It is also worth noting that many of these studies measure health
care quality through outcome indicators such as mortality, but do not provide a means of
assessing the quality of a patient's experience at a health care facility.
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which health care is delivered is important to health care outcomes, even beyond health
spending. This eect is dicult to separate from the eect of health spending, given the
high collinearity of GDP per capita of a region and health care spending per capita on
constituents. Nonetheless, the eect is important to consider, as it may capture indirect
community resources which are valuable to the quality of health care. Thus, wealth of a
region could be expected to have a positive eect on health care quality.
0.5 Research Design
0.5.1 Data
To test the importance of the political, nancial, and institutional variables on the
quality of health services in Brazil as outlined above, I use data from the World Health
Organization (WHO)'s 2003 World Health Survey in Brazil. The sampling frame for the
2003 WHO survey in Brazil was all male and female adults (18 and over) who were in Brazil
at the time of the survey. The sample size was 5000. Specics regarding the sampling de-
sign of the WHO survey are available from the WHO and Vasconcellos et al. (2005). The
survey team recorded the longitude and latitude of each of the survey respondents, as well
as demographic information and a variety of responses to health-specic questions.
In order to construct a dataset from which I could test my hypotheses, I subset the
original dataset to look only at respondents who had provided information about a primary
care health visit in the past six months. I then mapped the longitude and latitude data for
these respondents onto political territories at the municipal level using pattern mapping in
ArcGIS. All but twenty observations fell within dened political boundaries or close enough
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possible to determine the municipality of the respondent were dropped from the dataset.
Having mapped each of the WHO respondents onto a municipality, I was able
to match the WHO survey data with data specic to the Brazilian municipalities. Total
revenue, tax revenue, spending, and health spending data at the municipal level were ob-
tained through the Minist erio da Fazenda. All electoral data was obtained from the Tribunal
Superior Eleitoral (TSE).
After I had aggregated my raw data, I performed multiple imputation using the
Amelia package in R (King et al., 2001) to ll in missing data. I then created a second
data set in which observations were not at the individual level but at the municipal level.
In this dataset, I converted the individual level characteristics from the original dataset
into proportions at the municipal level. For example, the municipal level dataset included
variables for average age, gender ratio, average socioeconomic status, and percentage of
dierent racial groups in the municipality.
0.5.2 Independent Variables
Demographic Variables
Age (age), gender (sex), and race (racial.background) were all included in the 2003
survey. For racial background, I constructed separate binary variables for each of the major
racial categories in the survey: white, black, mulatto, and indigenous. In order to account
for socioeconomic status, I performed an exploratory factor analysis on survey items related
to household standard of living. An analysis of Eigenvalues and a scree plot suggested that
one factor was reasonable for SES. Based on this EFA, I created a factor for socioeconomic
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.30 or better. These items, as well as their loadings, are included in Table 9 below. The nal
variable for socioeconomic status of a respondent is coded as SESfactor.
Table 9: Factor Loadings for Socioeconomic Status Variable
Item SESfactor loading
Do you have a washing machine for clothes (yes/no)? .462
Do you have a dishwasher? .395
Do you have a vacuum cleaner? .347
Do you have a refrigerator? .523
Do you have a xed line telephone? .550
Do you have a computer? .696
Do you have internet access? .684
Do you have a music box? .321
Do you have a microwave? .590
Is anyone employed in the home? .528
Electoral Variables
In order to test my hypothesis regarding clientelistic spending, I used electoral data
from the TSE to create a binary variable (same) for each two-year period from 1996 to 2004
which was coded as 1 if the mayor and governor came from the same party during that
two-year period and as 0 if they were from dierent parties. I also created a binary variable
(pt) for whether the mayor came from the Workers' Party (PT) in the periods 1996-2000 and
2000-2004. Finally, I created a measure of electoral competitiveness (perc.valid) by recording
the percentage of valid votes a given mayor had won in the election. In both elections which
went to a run-o and those which did not, the percentage of valid votes was taken from the
rst round.
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Using data from the Brazilian Finance Ministry, I created three separate variables re-
lated to a given municipality's revenue and spending. The rst (health.percap) was simply
health spending per capita in a given year leading up to the survey. The second (cur-
rent.rev.per.cap) was an indicator of the wealth of the municipality, measured as current
revenue per capita. Finally, I measured scal capacity (tax.of.current) by taking tax revenue
as a percentage of total current revenue in the municipality.
0.5.3 Dependent Variable: Quality of Health Care Services
Because the survey responses provided only self-reported perceptions of quality of care,
the survey results could have been biased by dierential item functioning (DIF), or individu-
als' dierent subjective rating systems for external stimuli. In order to correct for this bias, I
used respondents' ratings of health care vignettes in the survey to adjust their self-reported
data for their own subjective biases using the anchoring method discussed in Wand, King,
and Lau (2011). Though the method is discussed in detail elsewhere, I oer brief comments
here on the application of the anchoring method to this particular research design.
The WHO survey oered ve vignettes related to each self-reported variable of
interest. For example, the vignette set related to the clarity of the doctor's communication
included, among others, the following vignettes:
R-Vignette - Set B Q-1: "[Jen] had time to ask the doctor some questions,
which the doctor answered until [Jen] understood almost everything. How
would you rate the experience of how clearly health care providers explained
things to her?"
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doctor because she was feeling dizzy. The doctor didn't have time to answer
her questions or to explain anything. He sent her away with a piece of paper
without telling her what is said. How would you rate her experience of how
clearly health care providers explained things to her?"
Respondents were asked to rate the vignettes on a scale of 1-5. In order to use vignette
responses properly to correct for DIF, it is necessary to develop a `consensus' ordering of
the vignettes; that is, there must be a single ideal way in which the respondents would rank
the vignettes from best to worst care. I used the anchors package in R to determine the
most commonly assigned ordering of vignettes by respondents, and treated this as the ideal
ordering. For respondents who ranked the vignettes according to the consensus ordering,
direct adjustment of self-reported experiences was possible. For respondents who ranked
the vignettes in a way other than the consensus ordering, adjusted self-reported experience
variables took into account the distribution of all possible ratings. This is discussed in-depth
in King and Wand (2007).
To account for the potential multiple dimensions of the quality of health care
services, I performed an EFA on questions from the WHO survey related to the respondent's
perception of the health care he or she received. I performed the factor analysis both for
the respondents' rating prior to and after adjustment for DIF through anchoring vignettes.
That is, I created two vectors of dependent variables: one for unadjusted quality ratings,
and one for adjusted quality ratings, and used an EFA to determine factor loadings for the
survey items under each model.
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into more specic variables (quality of communication, quality of facility, etc.), and used
Eigenvalues and a scree plot to compare the merit of dierent factor models. Ultimately,
I found that seemingly dierent aspects of the quality of care loaded well onto the same
factor, which corresponds to the experience dimension of quality discussed above. Included
in this one factor are survey items which had a factor loading of .30 or higher. The questions
included, and the factor loadings for both the unadjusted and adjusted quality variables, can
all be found in Table 10 below.
Table 10: Quality Items and Loadings
Item Loadings
Unadjusted Quality Adjusted Quality
Rate the amount of time you waited before
being attended to
.70 .52
Rate the experience of being greeted respect-
fully
.80 .75
Rate the experience of how clearly health
care providers communicated
.85 .84
Rate the experience of getting enough time
to ask questions
.55 .84
Rate your experience of being involved in
making decisions about your health care or
treatment
.51 .61
Rate the way the health services ensured you
could talk privately to health care providers
.66 .55
Rate the amount of space in waiting and ex-
amination rooms
.84 .68
Rate the cleanliness of rooms inside the fa-
cility, including toilets
.78 .81
Rate the experience of getting information
about other types of treatment or tests
.49 .78
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I performed two dierent types of analysis in order to determine which, if any, of my
theoretical predictions would be helpful in explaining variance in self-reported quality of
health care services. First, I performed an individual-level analysis in which the indepen-
dent variables consisted of age, sex, a factor variable for socioeconomic status and dierent
dummy variables for self-reported race of white, black, mulatto, or indigenous. I performed
this analysis twice, once with the dependent variable as a factor for health care quality un-
adjusted for individual bias (as demonstrated by the anchoring vignettes), and once with
the dependent variable adjusted for individual bias.
The second analysis that I performed was at the municipal level, using the mu-
nicipal dataset described in the Data section above. I performed four dierent regressions at
the municipal level. Two of the regressions used unadjusted quality ratings as the dependent
variable, and two of them used adjusted quality ratings. I performed two separate analyses
for each dependent variable. In both analyses I included variables for average or proportional
demographic characteristics, electoral variables, scal capacity, and wealth of the municipal-
ity. In one of the regressions with the dependent variable of adjusted quality rating and one
with the dependent variable of unadjusted quality rating, I included a variable for health
spending; in the other two, I did not. The exclusion of a health spending variable in one set
of regressions allowed me to evaluate the potential impact of PT governance and alignment
in parties between the municipal and state levels without introducing post-treatment bias
(King 2010).
The results at the individual and at the municipal level suggest a very similar
story. Age and socioeconomic status of respondents are important determinants of the qual-
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signicance. Regression results are included below. I have included only the individual level
results for the unadjusted quality ratings. I also ran regressions for the adjusted ratings and
found no signicant dierences between the models.
The socioeconomic status nding is not surprising. As discussed above, numerous
studies have shown that less well-o individuals may report receiving lower quality of care.
The nding is particularly unsurprising in the context of Brazil's unique health model. Given
that Brazil has a public subcontractor model, with many publicly-funded health services be-
ing provided by private personnel and facilities, it was not reasonable to remove individuals
whose treatments had occurred at private facilities from the dataset. However, by includ-
ing private facilities in the analysis, I have allowed survey respondents who may have paid
out-of-pocket for expensive, high-quality private care to be included in the analysis. That
said, given that the majority of health care services provided at private facilities are actually
nanced through public insurance and fall within the SUS health system, as well as the level
of signicance that the SESfactor achieves in this analysis (p <.001), it seems likely that
much of the disparity in self-reported care is occurring within the public system.
Although I had intuitively expected that older patients might not be cared for as
well as younger patients, the nding that they in fact report higher quality of care agrees
with previous research as discussed earlier. The present analysis contributes meaningfully
to these past studies, as past work has not accounted for the possibility that older patients
might report better care because their expectations were simply lower. Indeed, both a col-
lege student and a retired person might objectively receive the same quality of care, but if
the retired person had been expecting to receive poor care, he or she might rate it more
highly than the younger patient. Because I ran my model with both the dependent variable
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bias (DIF) in reporting, and used the WHO vignettes to correct for this bias. Because the
results in the unadjusted and adjusted quality models do not dier signicantly, I conclude
that older patients did receive a higher standard of care than their younger counterparts.
While I was disappointed with the lack of signicant results at the municipal
level, and particularly with regard to political variables, there are a couple of reasons that
these results may not be signicant. The rst reason relates to the issue of preventative
care versus curative care. To create my datasets from the WHO survey data with individ-
ual responses about their health care experiences in the last six months, it was necessary
to subset the data, as discussed previously, to consider only the respondents in the survey
sample who reported having visited a health facility in the six months prior to the survey.
If certain individuals were receiving good, or improved, preventative care, and consequently
had not visited a health facility in recent months, they would not have been included in
my survey. Although I had expected that there might be an eect of either PT governance
or coordinated municipal and state governance on health care quality reports, it is possible
that these political considerations aected aspects of the health system associated primarily
with preventative care. If PT municipal governance focused on getting individuals who had
previously been forced to see the doctor regularly on an appropriate preventative medical
regimen, rather than making sure that the individuals' health visits were of high quality,
then the PT would still be having an important positive eect on municipal health, but it
would not be demonstrated by my analysis.
I was initially surprised by the failure of health spending per capita to explain
dierences in quality reporting across municipalities, but this may be a function of the broad
category of health spending, and the more narrowly dened category of quality of health care
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(such as personnel training or facilities management) might impact the quality of experience
a patient had. On the other hand, the construction of a new facility in a dierent part of
the municipality might detract resources and training from a health clinic that was seeing
patients. Thus, broad conclusions about the eect of health spending might require more
disaggregated scal data.
With respect to the measure of scal capacity, it may be the case that a broader
measure of institutional performance would be a better predictor than the measure I am
currently using. Such a measure of institutional performance at the municipal level would
be extremely useful for research work beyond just health care analyses, and the development
of such an instrument should be treated as a high priority on the agenda of comparative
politics research.
Ultimately, although the municipal level results are disappointing, the individual
level results do accord well with past scholarship and expectations. With the careful caveats
mentioned above, specically regarding the nature of the public subcontractor model, I nd
that these results give substantial cause for concern that, in spite of greatly improved access
to health care since 1988, many Brazilians, and particularly those from lower socioeconomic
classes, do not feel as though the health care system is responding to their needs and expec-
tations in a satisfactory manner.
930.7 Conclusion
Health care in Brazil has made impressive strides over the past three decades, and the
universal care reform model oers valuable lessons to other countries in the region. More
Brazilians have access to health care than ever before, and many health outcome indicators,
such as mortality rates, are at all time lows. The movimento sanit aria's vision of universal
care has become increasingly close to a reality in the years since it was institutionalized in
the 1988 Constitution.
And yet despite increased access to care, great variation in the quality of health
care services remains. In this paper, I attempted to demonstrate that Brazilians of dier-
ent regions and dierent individual characteristics have signicantly dierent experiences in
their interaction with the health system. The most important ndings were that age and
socioeconomic class were strong predictors of the quality of experience that individuals re-
port. Older patients have more positive experiences, even when controlling for individual
biases, whereas poorer individuals report much more negative experiences. I suggested that
the public/private subcontractor model may play into these results, but that it is probably
not sucient as a unique explanation. My broad conclusion is that individual characteristics
matter a lot in the type of experience individuals have at health clinics, and these charac-
teristics matter even when individuals are coming from the same region and municipality.
On the other hand, political and scal characteristics of municipalities were not
helpful predictors of health care quality reports in my analysis. This may be because munic-
ipal variables matter less than anticipated, or it may be because municipal variables matter
for aspects of preventative care, which would fall outside the scope of this analysis. Further-
more, as discussed above, it could be the case that some variables, such as funding and party
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but matter less for the experience that individuals have at clinics which have already been
constructed and with personnel who have already been trained.
Ultimately, for Brazil to move in the direction of more equitable care for indi-
viduals of dierent backgrounds, the variation in individual health care experiences must
be addressed. To this end, it will be important to determine the driving force for lower
quality experiences among less well-o patients. Is it the case that these patients attend
the same clinics as middle and upper class patients, but are treated dierently once there?
Do these clinics have less-trained personnel and fewer resources available to patients funded
through public insurance than to those insured privately? Or are patients of lower socioe-
conomic classes visiting dierent clinics entirely, with more desirable clinics located in areas
of municipalities that are less accessible to poor families? Answers to these questions would
provide valuable insight into the mechanism through which socioeconomic status correlates
with less favorable patient experiences.
In many ways, the path of universal health care in Brazil seems to be following a
trajectory not dissimilar to that of democracy in much of the region. With its implementation
secure, the focus must shift to variation in quality and eectiveness of performance. My hope
is that this paper oers an initial step in this direction.
95Part V
Conclusion
96In the introduction to this dissertation, I noted that health reform had been a contin-
uous process for much of the twentieth century, and that the politics of reform and reform
implementation deserve considerably more attention from political scientists than they have
received to this point. In the papers I presented here, I have indicated three dierent as-
pects of health care and health reform into which political scientists should consider inserting
their frameworks more frequently. First, I evaluated the impact of reforms to the medica-
tion distribution process under Seguro Popular in Mexico, and noted that the dierences in
implementation across states should raise questions of institutional performance. Second, I
looked at determinants of health care spending at the subnational level in Brazil and found
that left governance consistently correlates with higher levels of municipal spending. Finally,
I proposed a new survey-based approach to thinking about the quality of health services in
Brazil, and the relationship of politics to quality.
The broad purpose of these papers was to indicate a role for political science in the
health care reform process which goes beyond the politics of policy decisions. Indeed, fund-
ing, execution of policy, and quality of output in health care should be at least as important
as the policies on paper for subjects of study. When Hacker wrote that health care reforms in
the US and Europe seemed to result in \reform without change and change without reform",
he indicated clearly that changes to health care structures occur in the absence of formal
policy change. And yet, most of the sparse literature on the politics of health reform has
focused solely on the politics of the reform process itself and the ultimate policy outcomes.
To move beyond this step, political scientists must look at implementation of policies as well
as the policies themselves.
I hope this dissertation will serve as a rst step in linking the frameworks of political
science to the priorities and outcomes of health reform. While I oer my own perspective
97on some of the links throughout the dissertation (institutional analysis and change, politi-
cal partisanship and the welfare state), further research might consider issues such as state
capacity. Political science can oer valuable insights into discussions of health reform such
that political considerations are no longer merely a \footnote" in otherwise well-intentioned
reform plans.
98Part VI
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990.8 Appendix A: Flowchart of Sampling and Attrition in the Household Survey from King et
al (2009)
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
100 clusters (65 072 households) 
paired on covariates 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
50 clusters (34 096 households) 
assigned treatment 
50 clusters (30 976 households) 
assigned control 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
17 950 households randomly 
sampled within clusters 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
17 907 households sampled by 
baseline canvassers 
18 231 households randomly 
sampled within clusters 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
18 307 households sampled by 
baseline canvassers 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
16 260 households  partially or 
fully surveyed at baseline 
16 261 households  partially or 
fully surveyed at baseline 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
16 259 households targeted for 
follow-up in panel survey 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
14 949 households  partially or fully 
surveyed at follow-up 
6744 households enrolled 
8205 households unenrolled 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
16 259 households after multiple 
imputation 
(ﬁve imputed data sets) 
7212 households enrolled 
9047 households unenrolled 
16 256 households targeted for 
follow-up in panel survey 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
14 948 households  partially or fully 
surveyed at follow-up 
1076 households enrolled 
13 872 households unenrolled 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
16 256 households after multiple 
imputation 
(ﬁve imputed data sets) 
1205 households enrolled 
15 051 households unenrolled 
1000.9 Appendix B: Medication Codings
(1) INFECTION 
Aciclover 
Albendazole 
Amikacin 
Amoxicillin 
Ampicillin 
Bactrim 
Benzyl Benzoate Dermic Emulsion 
Cefotaxime 
Cephalexin 
Chloramphenicol 
Chloramphenicol Opthalmic 
Ciprofloxacin 
Clarithromycin 
Clavulanic Acid 
Clindamycin 
Clioquinol cream 
Dehydroemetine 
Dicloxacillin 
Doxycycline 
Erythromycin 
Ethambutol 
Furoxone 
Gentamicin 
Isoconazole 
Isoniazid 
Itraconazole 
Ketoconazole 
Lindane 
Mebendazole 
Metronidazole 
Miconazole 
Neomycin 
Neomycin, Polymyxin B, Gramacidin 
Nitazoxanide 
Nitazoxanide 
Nitrofurantoin 
Nitrofurazone 
Nystatin 
Penicillin 
Pyrantel Pamoate 
Rifampicin, Isoniazid, Pyrazinamide 
Silver Sulfadiazine 
Streptomycin 
Tetracycline 
Trimethoprim 
Vancomycin 
 
 
 
(2) RESPIRATORY  
Ambroxol 
Aminophylline 
Benzonatate 
Cromolyn sodium 
Dextromethorphan 
Ipratropium 
Ipratropium Bromide 
Ketotifen  
Montelukast 
Safirlukast 
Salbutamol 
Theophylline 
Zafirlukast  
 
 
(3) CARDIAC, BLOOD,  
CHOLESTEROL 
Alphamethyldopa 
Bezafibrate 
Candesartan 
Captopril 
Chlorothiazide 
Chlorthalidone 
Cilexetil/HCT 
Digoxin 
Dipyridamole  
Enalapril 
Furosemide 
Glyceryl Trinitrate 
Glyceryl trinitrate patches 
HCT 
Hydralazine 
Irbesartan 
Isosorbide 
Licinopril 
Losartan 
Metoprolol 
Nicardipine 
Nifedipine 
Potassium/HCT 
Pravastatin 
Prazosin 
Propranolol 
Telmisartan 
Verapamil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) PAIN, ALLERGIES,  
INFLAMMATION 
Acetaminophen 
Allopurinol 
Aspirin 
Astemizole 
Avapena 
Azathioprine 
Azathioprine 
Beclomethasone 
Benadryl 
Betamethasone 
Capsaicin 
Celecoxib 
Chlorpheniramine 
Colchicine 
Cortisone 
Dexamethasone 
Diclofenac 
Dihexazin (Viternum) 
Diphenhydramine 
Dipyrone 
Hydrocortisone 
Indomethacin 
Ketorolac 
Lidocaine 
Loratadine 
Metamizole 
Naproxen 
Paracetamol (INN) 
Phenazopyridine 
Piroxicam 
Prednisone 
Prednisone Opthalmic Solution 
Probenecid 
Rofecoxib 
Sodium Cromoglycate 
Xylocaine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) GI DISORDERS 
Aluminum and Magnesium Hydroxide 
Bismuth Subsaliscylate 
Butylscopolamine 
Cisapride 
Diphenidol 
Hiosultrina  
Metoclopramide 
Omeprazole 
Pinaverium Bromide 
Psyllium 
Ranitidine 
sennosides 
Sodium Bicarbonate 
Spasmopriv 
Sucralfate 
Esomeprazole 
Loperamide 
 
(6) GLYCEMIC DISORDERS 
Acarbose Glibenclamide 
Glucose 
Insulin 
Metformin 
Pioglitazone 
Rosiglitazone 
Tolbutamide 
 
 
(7) VITAMIN/MINERAL DEFICIENCIES 
Aluminum and Magnesium 
B Complex 
Calcium 
Crystalline Sodium 
Ferrous Sulfate Oral Solution 
Folic Acid 
Hartmann’s Solution 
Iron 
Micronutrientes  
Multivitamin 
Nutrisano 
Nutrivida 
Oral Electrolytes 
Sodium Chloride 
Suero Oral Life 
Thiamin 
Vitamin A and C 
Vitamin C 
Vitamin D 
Vitamin K 
Water, injectable 
Zinc 
1010.10 Appendix B (continued): Medication Codings
(8) NEUROLOGICAL  
Carbamazepine 
Diazepam 
Diphenylhydantoin 
Imipramine 
Magnesium Valproate 
Phenobarbital 
Phenytoin 
 
(9) ENDOCRINE AND  
BIRTH CONTROL 
Chlormadinone 
Condoms 
Contraceptives 
Desogestrel and Ethinyl Estradiol 
Ergometrine 
Estrogen 
Finasteride 
IUD 
Levonorgestrel 
Levothyroxine 
Medroxyprogesterone 
Methimazole 
Methylergometrine 
Norethisterone 
Oxytocin 
Thyroxine 
 
(10) VACCINE 
BCG 
Diptheria 
DPT+HB+Hib 
MMR 
Polio 
Tetanus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(11) OTHER 
Adrenaline/Epinephrine 
Alacramyn 
Anti-scorpion serum 
Anti-venom serum 
Atropine Injectable Solution 
Benzyl 
Caliderm Cream 
Finasteride 
Fluocinolone 
Lassar paste 
Naphazoline 
Papilla 
Sweet Almond Oil 
Tamsulosin 
Timolol Opthalmic Solution 
Vero cells 
Zinc Oxide Paste 
	 ﾠ
1020.11 Appendix C: Units of Medication at Treatment and Control Facilities by Indication
Baseline Post-Treatment
Infection
Treatment 711.02 1671.65
Control 835.07 1132.75
Dierence -135.07 538.90
Respiratory
Treatment 76.56 115.94
Control 71.83 49.34
Dierence 4.73 66.60
Cardiac, Blood, Cholesterol
Treatment 87.25 195.79
Control 86.00 90.89
Dierence 1.25 104.90
Pain, Allergies, Inammation
Treatment 341.15 664.46
Control 332.20 462.74
Dierence 8.95 201.72
GI Disorders
Treatment 69.02 265.11
Control 65.25 191.17
Dierence 3.77 73.94
Glycemic Disorders
Treatment 65.84 128.92
Control 75.07 108.72
Dierence -9.23 20.20
Vitamin/Mineral Deciencies
Treatment 98.84 371.46
Control 148.14 289.00
Dierence -49.30 82.46
Neurological
Treatment 4.52 31.14
Control 7.44 11.20
Dierence -2.92 19.94
Endocrine and Birth Control
Treatment 26.84 36.03
Control 44.20 37.52
Dierence -17.36 -1.49
Vaccine
Treatment 52.51 52.51
Control 48.46 48.46
Dierence 4.05 4.05
Other
Treatment 38.69 35.08
Control 33.02 33.58
Dierence 5.67 1.50
1030.12 Appendix D: Units of Medication at Treatment and Control Facilities by Indication
Control Facilities Indications
Facility Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
GRSSA000046 Post-Treatment 1145 0 2 346 214 180 360 0 35 390 7 2679
Baseline 1596 70 40 245 174 47 0 0 0 0 18 2190
Dierence -451 -70 -38 101 40 133 360 0 35 390 -11 489
GRSSA000051 Post-Treatment 50 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 70
Baseline 383 26 15 79 19 0 96 0 0 0 33 651
Dierence -333 -26 -15 -79 -19 0 -76 0 0 0 -33 -581
GRSSA000104 Post-Treatment 946 2 39 527 234 480 0 0 27 299 114 2668
Baseline 472 81 70 298 26 0 0 0 0 0 50 997
Dierence 474 -79 -31 229 208 480 0 0 27 299 64 1671
GRSSA000886 Post-Treatment 971 0 112 699 193 132 543 0 0 0 54 2704
Baseline 270 40 63 0 0 155 42 0 0 0 0 570
Dierence 701 -40 49 699 193 -23 501 0 0 0 54 2134
GRSSA003044 Post-Treatment 258 0 0 25 30 25 40 0 0 48 9 435
Baseline 242 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 252
Dierence 16 0 0 15 30 25 40 0 0 48 9 183
GRSSA004526 Post-Treatment 3016 5 23 222 458 73 183 0 286 20 57 4343
Baseline 2063 9 0 315 143 276 1 0 0 0 223 3030
Dierence 953 -4 23 -93 315 -203 182 0 286 20 -166 1313
MCSSA000026 Post-Treatment 37 0 15 104 64 4 7 0 0 0 16 247
Baseline 83 28 100 595 200 60 0 0 0 0 34 1100
Dierence -46 -28 -85 -491 -136 -56 7 0 0 0 -18 -853
MCSSA000183 Post-Treatment 659 11 54 358 201 90 100 0 3 262 32 1770
Baseline 735 54 88 393 136 110 0 0 5 0 0 1521
Dierence -76 -43 -34 -35 65 -20 100 0 -2 262 32 249
MCSSA000306 Post-Treatment 3702 181 15 1381 836 131 29 0 13 0 58 6346
Baseline 585 27 32 114 0 3 0 0 1 0 22 784
Dierence 3117 154 -17 1267 836 128 29 0 12 0 36 5562
MCSSA000352 Post-Treatment 798 65 230 1735 296 38 665 32 13 0 22 3894
Baseline 935 104 110 477 140 150 0 0 0 0 0 1916
Dierence -137 -39 120 1258 156 -112 665 32 13 0 22 1978
MCSSA000504 Post-Treatment 4807 226 285 1509 700 76 600 0 142 0 102 8447
Baseline 2136 197 152 1019 71 104 1072 0 251 0 121 5123
Dierence 2671 29 133 490 629 -28 -472 0 -109 0 -19 3324
MCSSA000702 Post-Treatment 1534 18 0 493 15 46 264 45 29 209 4 2657
Baseline 609 17 384 531 46 18 50 0 0 0 44 1699
Dierence 925 1 -384 -38 -31 28 214 45 29 209 -40 958
MCSSA000731 Post-Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Baseline 449 0 82 130 39 0 60 0 52 0 25 837
Dierence -449 0 -82 -130 -39 0 -60 0 -52 0 -25 -837
MCSSA001513 Post-Treatment 1048 9 76 160 58 94 148 0 28 8 17 1646
Baseline 383 26 15 79 19 0 96 0 0 0 33 651
Dierence 665 -17 61 81 39 94 52 0 28 8 -16 995
MCSSA001525 Post-Treatment 978 0 43 40 53 22 133 20 70 7 0 1366
Baseline 605 0 111 303 62 162 16 0 91 0 23 1373
Dierence 373 0 -68 -263 -9 -140 117 20 -21 7 -23 -7
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Control Facilities Indications
Facility Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
MCSSA002954 Post-Treatment 89 3 17 30 15 13 45 8 12 65 1 298
Baseline 711 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 727
Dierence -622 3 17 30 15 13 29 8 12 65 1 -429
MCSSA002971 Post-Treatment 2900 160 56 1919 1663 220 1571 84 50 27 0 8650
Baseline 520 0 135 250 27 45 121 0 0 0 146 1244
Dierence 2380 160 -79 1669 1636 175 1450 84 50 27 -146 7406
MCSSA003024 Post-Treatment 3260 75 98 2699 1501 137 398 17 91 25 42 8343
Baseline 2445 81 134 586 0 8 16 0 0 0 0 3270
Dierence 815 -6 -36 2113 1501 129 382 17 91 25 42 5073
MCSSA003386 Post-Treatment 1322 0 97 670 260 140 238 30 20 203 59 3039
Baseline 1082 63 50 290 1 51 448 7 4 0 44 2040
Dierence 240 -63 47 380 259 89 -210 23 16 203 15 999
MCSSA003461 Post-Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Baseline 1804 69 97 255 18 166 170 0 1155 0 20 3754
Dierence -1804 -69 -97 -255 -18 -166 -170 0 -1155 0 -20 -3754
MCSSA004704 Post-Treatment 606 65 0 176 303 96 159 0 9 39 39 1492
Baseline 494 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 524
Dierence 112 65 0 176 303 66 159 0 9 39 39 968
MCSSA005223 Post-Treatment 1934 206 4 1253 74 2 449 4 0 0 70 3996
Baseline 2340 120 297 1278 212 60 70 0 158 0 186 4721
Dierence -406 86 -293 -25 -138 -58 379 4 -158 0 -116 -725
MCSSA005235 Post-Treatment 4525 130 176 1227 361 37 437 0 518 0 2 7413
Baseline 2928 250 169 1241 77 86 281 0 496 0 58 5586
Dierence 1597 -120 7 -14 284 -49 156 0 22 0 -56 1827
MCSSA005800 Post-Treatment 239 0 49 128 27 49 419 0 13 0 6 930
Baseline 331 20 19 90 5 10 62 0 0 0 10 547
Dierence -92 -20 30 38 22 39 357 0 13 0 -4 383
MCSSA005841 Post-Treatment 579 17 62 115 41 3 631 0 11 0 6 1465
Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dierence 579 17 62 115 41 3 631 0 11 0 6 1465
MCSSA006034 Post-Treatment 645 0 30 301 130 82 95 0 20 0 3 1306
Baseline 810 0 0 250 200 0 100 0 0 0 100 1460
Dierence -165 0 30 51 -70 82 -5 0 20 0 -97 -154
MCSSA006133 Post-Treatment 373 17 0 1287 1114 0 0 0 0 12 6 2809
Baseline 833 110 310 1023 80 50 150 0 0 0 0 2556
Dierence -460 -93 -310 264 1034 -50 -150 0 0 12 6 253
MCSSA008180 Post-Treatment 1400 40 31 255 130 13 112 0 100 28 0 2109
Baseline 411 65 0 200 25 0 90 0 0 0 0 791
Dierence 989 -25 31 55 105 13 22 0 100 28 0 1318
MCSSA008204 Post-Treatment 1152 63 170 718 72 77 166 149 21 0 11 2599
Baseline 1027 166 0 760 140 5 33 0 0 0 36 2167
Dierence 125 -103 170 -42 -68 72 133 149 21 0 -25 432
MCSSA000594 Post-Treatment 352 15 40 200 10 62 725 20 0 19 17 1460
Baseline 202 12 131 417 2 13 135 2 1 0 0 915
Dierence 150 3 -91 -217 8 49 590 18 -1 19 17 545
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Control Facilities Indications
Facility Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
MSSSA000640 Post-Treatment 430 10 80 75 0 1 130 10 0 20 20 776
Baseline 69 50 69 63 0 20 30 45 0 0 7 353
Dierence 361 -40 11 12 0 -19 100 -35 0 20 13 423
MSSSA000775 Post-Treatment 441 28 0 8 25 63 454 0 0 5 40 1064
Baseline 439 111 0 104 16 0 207 0 0 0 54 931
Dierence 2 -83 0 -96 9 63 247 0 0 5 -14 133
MSSSA000780 Post-Treatment 332 52 29 105 94 40 71 0 0 72 10 805
Baseline 159 63 0 40 0 30 51 3 0 0 7 353
Dierence 173 -11 29 65 94 10 20 -3 0 72 3 452
MSSSA000816 Post-Treatment 141 500 80 240 0 0 124 0 0 34 307 1426
Baseline 467 139 80 179 0 140 60 0 0 0 75 1140
Dierence -326 361 0 61 0 -140 64 0 0 34 232 286
MSSSA000833 Post-Treatment 389 40 110 114 29 98 250 0 60 191 28 1309
Baseline 2282 102 46 326 111 37 353 0 0 0 85 3342
Dierence -1893 -62 64 -212 -82 61 -103 0 60 191 -57 -2033
MSSSA000903 Post-Treatment 371 85 30 5 9 21 136 0 48 128 22 855
Baseline 69 56 0 94 0 29 247 6 7 0 7 515
Dierence 302 29 30 -89 9 -8 -111 -6 41 128 15 340
MSSSA000932 Post-Treatment 1186 156 193 1278 94 0 668 7 140 16 107 3845
Baseline 1169 111 72 471 73 45 225 0 0 0 55 2221
Dierence 17 45 121 807 21 -45 443 7 140 16 52 1624
MSSSA000944 Post-Treatment 503 50 95 40 4 350 155 0 0 29 12 1238
Baseline 859 0 222 222 66 158 268 10 0 0 0 1805
Dierence -356 50 -127 -182 -62 192 -113 -10 0 29 12 -567
MSSSA001376 Post-Treatment 218 67 56 123 31 53 50 11 6 18 39 672
Baseline 359 90 40 290 20 0 0 0 0 0 60 859
Dierence -141 -23 16 -167 11 53 50 11 6 18 -21 -187
MSSSA001393 Post-Treatment 79 0 20 11 2 32 48 0 0 6 10 208
Baseline 576 4 0 145 20 0 78 0 0 0 117 940
Dierence -497 -4 20 -134 -18 32 -30 0 0 6 -107 -732
MSSSA001434 Post-Treatment 436 20 70 509 70 120 1228 0 0 0 60 2513
Baseline 430 165 0 148 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 805
Dierence 6 -145 70 361 8 120 1228 0 0 0 60 1708
MSSSA001912 Post-Treatment 86 0 5 22 5 24 330 5 30 28 21 556
Baseline 71 32 0 47 0 11 23 10 0 0 3 197
Dierence 15 -32 5 -25 5 13 307 -5 30 28 18 359
MSSSA001924 Post-Treatment 147 200 153 637 30 447 828 47 230 20 140 2879
Baseline 2044 8 300 992 525 542 460 0 9 0 0 4880
Dierence -1897 192 -147 -355 -495 -95 368 47 221 20 140 -2001
MSSSA001965 Post-Treatment 470 17 165 192 32 55 325 0 20 125 26 1427
Baseline 53 68 0 32 0 29 39 5 0 0 7 233
Dierence 417 -51 165 160 32 26 286 -5 20 125 19 1194
MSSSA001970 Post-Treatment 183 0 17 60 26 25 65 2 2 7 12 399
Baseline 937 129 55 338 90 65 100 0 0 0 0 1714
Dierence -754 -129 -38 -278 -64 -40 -35 2 2 7 12 -1315
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Control Facilities Indications
Facility Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
MSSSA001982 Post-Treatment 267 13 3 102 46 19 178 0 10 40 30 708
Baseline 805 77 12 8 160 0 92 0 25 0 0 1179
Dierence -538 -64 -9 94 -114 19 86 0 -15 40 30 -471
OCSSA002834 Post-Treatment 101 3 20 7 16 20 11 25 6 15 19 243
Baseline 566 52 68 30 10 61 85 0 18 0 0 890
Dierence -465 -49 -48 -23 6 -41 -74 25 -12 15 19 -647
OCSSA005441 Post-Treatment 50 0 11 0 10 10 5 35 0 0 0 121
Baseline 196 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 199
Dierence -146 0 11 0 10 10 2 35 0 0 0 -78
OCSSA005786 Post-Treatment 813 0 0 50 0 480 160 8 0 13 8 1532
Baseline 1465 380 70 452 94 600 2091 220 332 0 80 5784
Dierence -652 -380 -70 -402 -94 -120 -1931 -212 -332 13 -72 -4252
SPSSA002041 Post-Treatment 245 0 44 318 0 0 533 0 0 170 40 1350
Baseline 1070 40 192 587 80 909 151 0 0 0 39 3068
Dierence -825 -40 -148 -269 -80 -909 382 0 0 170 1 -1718
SPSSA002065 Post-Treatment 13052 240 270 2853 468 1998 2248 0 78 6 98 21311
Baseline 525 45 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 670
Dierence 12527 195 270 2753 468 1998 2248 0 78 6 98 20641
SRSSA000714 Post-Treatment 2157 23 370 750 166 67 680 25 43 30 60 4371
Baseline 1062 240 179 501 222 80 215 2 0 0 35 2536
Dierence 1095 -217 191 249 -56 -13 465 23 43 30 25 1835
SRSSA002003 Post-Treatment 671 26 121 284 109 34 123 26 26 0 7 1427
Baseline 375 42 100 689 0 0 0 115 0 0 0 1321
Dierence 296 -16 21 -405 109 34 123 -89 26 0 7 106
SRSSA002160 Post-Treatment 495 56 218 170 106 66 80 40 0 0 24 1255
Baseline 485 160 560 720 160 20 0 0 3 0 0 2108
Dierence 10 -104 -342 -550 -54 46 80 40 -3 0 24 -853
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Treatment Facilities Indications
Facility Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
GRSSA002875 Post-Treatment 8266 134 1394 2401 418 1684 1193 0 121 0 90 15701
Baseline 374 0 2 0 119 5 0 0 0 0 0 500
Dierence 7892 134 1392 2401 299 1679 1193 0 121 0 90 15201
GRSSA004531 Post-Treatment 736 14 50 46 84 53 85 2 60 8 9 1147
Baseline 265 107 567 92 166 8 39 0 0 0 78 1322
Dierence 471 -93 -517 -46 -82 45 46 2 60 8 -69 -175
JCSSA002340 Post-Treatment 1586 88 161 732 313 160 994 16 85 648 94 4877
Baseline 1288 0 86 970 200 592 430 0 0 0 0 3566
Dierence 298 88 75 -238 113 -432 564 16 85 648 94 1311
MCSSA000060 Post-Treatment 546 10 3 6 4 12 103 0 0 0 11 695
Baseline 340 20 50 370 30 55 0 0 65 0 35 965
Dierence 206 -10 -47 -364 -26 -43 103 0 -65 0 -24 -270
MCSSA000171 Post-Treatment 1881 190 9 91 53 12 179 2 8 8 4 2437
Baseline 981 85 61 288 94 70 303 3 16 0 35 1936
Dierence 900 105 -52 -197 -41 -58 -124 -1 -8 8 -31 501
MCSSA000282 Post-Treatment 4389 255 8 1668 852 346 2033 0 19 0 76 9646
Baseline 2171 74 134 394 42 49 36 0 20 0 62 2982
Dierence 2218 181 -126 1274 810 297 1997 0 -1 0 14 6664
MCSSA000796 Post-Treatment 773 100 2 575 36 12 63 0 10 65 27 1663
Baseline 726 129 413 103 23 67 48 0 0 0 35 1544
Dierence 47 -29 -411 472 13 -55 15 0 10 65 -8 119
MCSSA000813 Post-Treatment 1086 29 17 159 46 15 152 0 16 0 9 1529
Baseline 465 12 33 59 0 0 32 0 0 0 8 609
Dierence 621 17 -16 100 46 15 120 0 16 0 1 920
MCSSA000854 Post-Treatment 647 5 49 187 47 18 449 0 47 10 31 1490
Baseline 29 16 64 83 23 10 10 0 48 0 15 298
Dierence 618 -11 -15 104 24 8 439 0 -1 10 16 1192
MCSSA001863 Post-Treatment 1761 46 73 899 712 123 102 0 25 0 19 3760
Baseline 1614 232 58 611 400 2 279 0 31 0 77 3304
Dierence 147 -186 15 288 312 121 -177 0 -6 0 -58 456
MCSSA002044 Post-Treatment 13834 640 1710 1100 2398 0 40 0 0 360 200 20282
Baseline 5859 390 509 1862 391 288 608 0 0 0 91 9998
Dierence 7975 250 1201 -762 2007 -288 -568 0 0 360 109 10284
MCSSA002790 Post-Treatment 537 0 20 130 40 0 110 3 20 0 2 862
Baseline 220 0 140 270 0 180 40 0 80 0 30 960
Dierence 317 0 -120 -140 40 -180 70 3 -60 0 -28 -98
MCSSA003000 Post-Treatment 1163 660 380 375 230 10 150 75 40 30 65 3178
Baseline 77 0 5 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 0 114
Dierence 1086 660 375 375 230 10 118 75 40 30 65 3064
MCSSA003012 Post-Treatment 4132 630 110 1879 200 190 1194 20 0 0 104 8459
Baseline 1065 0 30 200 2 20 20 0 0 0 10 1347
Dierence 3067 630 80 1679 198 170 1174 20 0 0 94 7112
MCSSA003316 Post-Treatment 3898 34 78 1904 1002 169 162 0 158 16 24 7445
Baseline 1613 57 92 351 107 170 0 0 20 0 90 2500
Dierence 2285 -23 -14 1553 895 -1 162 0 138 16 -66 4945
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Treatment Facilities Indications
Facility Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
MCSSA005240 Post-Treatment 3477 118 13 4087 1279 25 454 0 67 12 62 9594
Baseline 602 0 0 40 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 670
Dierence 2875 118 13 4047 1279 25 426 0 67 12 62 8924
MCSSA005264 Post-Treatment 806 11 47 2732 676 20 272 528 10 0 0 5102
Baseline 310 0 20 1020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1350
Dierence 496 11 27 1712 676 20 272 528 10 0 0 3752
MCSSA005322 Post-Treatment 1912 190 391 1239 654 0 202 4 64 5 0 4661
Baseline 662 125 52 2281 44 126 32 0 1 0 0 3323
Dierence 1250 65 339 -1042 610 -126 170 4 63 5 0 1338
MCSSA005853 Post-Treatment 493 65 10 128 5 0 200 0 0 16 7 924
Baseline 721 44 147 177 21 34 59 0 0 0 15 1218
Dierence -228 21 -137 -49 -16 -34 141 0 0 16 -8 -294
MCSSA005894 Post-Treatment 1160 18 597 86 72 0 772 0 30 0 2 2737
Baseline 354 0 239 80 35 60 0 0 7 0 30 805
Dierence 806 18 358 6 37 -60 772 0 23 0 -28 1932
MCSSA005906 Post-Treatment 17 1 4 9 5 3 8 0 4 5 2 58
Baseline 21 11 27 77 5 10 0 0 0 0 11 162
Dierence -4 -10 -23 -68 0 -7 8 0 4 5 -9 -104
MCSSA005911 Post-Treatment 491 0 432 86 3 188 610 0 24 0 17 1851
Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 60
Dierence 491 0 432 86 3 188 550 0 24 0 17 1791
MCSSA006046 Post-Treatment 815 24 112 772 305 156 37 15 2 260 52 2550
Baseline 20 380 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 405
Dierence 795 -356 112 772 305 156 32 15 2 260 52 2145
MCSSA006063 Post-Treatment 2008 24 95 630 302 186 704 25 90 58 40 4162
Baseline 553 121 14 272 20 53 0 0 0 0 125 1158
Dierence 1455 -97 81 358 282 133 704 25 90 58 -85 3004
MCSSA006261 Post-Treatment 3389 35 96 1163 535 112 242 6 11 0 0 5589
Baseline 3078 212 347 673 485 122 119 0 41 0 10 5087
Dierence 311 -177 -251 490 50 -10 123 6 -30 0 -10 502
MCSSA008175 Post-Treatment 2139 80 60 628 374 146 644 34 24 114 16 4259
Baseline 1018 150 50 262 142 16 226 0 0 0 0 1864
Dierence 1121 -70 10 366 232 130 418 34 24 114 16 2395
MCSSA008221 Post-Treatment 634 46 0 354 135 38 339 5 6 16 26 1599
Baseline 374 0 45 190 56 0 39 1 0 0 3 708
Dierence 260 46 -45 164 79 38 300 4 6 16 23 891
MCSSA008262 Post-Treatment 1194 220 118 456 170 74 238 26 100 64 0 2660
Baseline 306 0 86 260 50 131 10 0 55 0 30 928
Dierence 888 220 32 196 120 -57 228 26 45 64 -30 1732
MCSSA008612 Post-Treatment 1112 100 136 866 114 90 460 60 20 50 60 3068
Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
Dierence 1112 100 136 866 114 90 458 60 20 50 60 3066
MSSSA000372 Post-Treatment 866 8 72 199 87 420 326 0 0 90 58 2126
Baseline 559 30 239 829 60 190 305 62 0 0 320 2594
Dierence 307 -22 -167 -630 27 230 21 -62 0 90 -262 -468
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Treatment Facilities Indications
Facility Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
MSSSA000384 Post-Treatment 381 38 28 126 105 24 182 19 122 26 66 1117
Baseline 509 642 102 701 0 91 0 4 0 0 52 2101
Dierence -128 -604 -74 -575 105 -67 182 15 122 26 14 -984
MSSSA000396 Post-Treatment 665 766 330 210 19 139 658 3 14 0 21 2825
Baseline 217 79 50 234 94 0 0 0 0 0 4 678
Dierence 448 687 280 -24 -75 139 658 3 14 0 17 2147
MSSSA000413 Post-Treatment 445 8 171 50 33 184 47 15 4 9 3 969
Baseline 1518 30 220 435 0 280 430 0 0 0 10 2923
Dierence -1073 -22 -49 -385 33 -96 -383 15 4 9 -7 -1954
MSSSA000430 Post-Treatment 841 134 527 196 59 5 54 72 7 11 86 1992
Baseline 561 67 85 208 105 200 160 0 0 0 10 1396
Dierence 280 67 442 -12 -46 -195 -106 72 7 11 76 596
MSSSA000553 Post-Treatment 488 26 119 202 52 57 104 11 0 0 61 1120
Baseline 263 22 28 122 7 4 34 4 0 0 60 544
Dierence 225 4 91 80 45 53 70 7 0 0 1 576
MSSSA000792 Post-Treatment 1365 52 172 600 416 182 534 34 12 30 62 3459
Baseline 289 120 129 519 33 3 48 0 0 0 76 1217
Dierence 1076 -68 43 81 383 179 486 34 12 30 -14 2242
MSSSA000804 Post-Treatment 1097 232 136 541 219 256 504 68 46 39 36 3174
Baseline 1073 162 58 637 224 50 268 9 0 0 62 2543
Dierence 24 70 78 -96 -5 206 236 59 46 39 -26 631
MSSSA001381 Post-Treatment 200 10 30 19 76 201 204 0 0 18 758
Baseline 622 158 0 262 127 42 177 0 0 0 108 1496
Dierence -422 -148 30 -243 -51 159 27 0 0 0 -90 -738
MSSSA001422 Post-Treatment 451 1 58 166 34 124 127 0 21 67 36 1085
Baseline 2214 90 100 700 0 50 56 0 0 0 270 3480
Dierence -1763 -89 -42 -534 34 74 71 0 21 67 -234 -2395
MSSSA001451 Post-Treatment 687 14 107 110 82 140 226 5 7 8 7 1393
Baseline 36 9 0 45 0 29 53 3 0 0 6 181
Dierence 651 5 107 65 82 111 173 2 7 8 1 1212
MSSSA001463 Post-Treatment 374 3 268 261 67 280 440 0 0 15 43 1751
Baseline 450 100 100 150 100 100 150 0 0 0 0 1150
Dierence -76 -97 168 111 -33 180 290 0 0 15 43 601
MSSSA001480 Post-Treatment 417 78 108 141 132 48 126 28 30 92 20 1220
Baseline 975 57 53 204 179 20 293 58 0 0 65 1904
Dierence -558 21 55 -63 -47 28 -167 -30 30 92 -45 -684
MSSSA001492 Post-Treatment 517 24 76 243 34 124 751 10 26 45 19 1869
Baseline 23 67 0 59 0 30 38 6 0 0 8 231
Dierence 494 -43 76 184 34 94 713 4 26 45 11 1638
MSSSA001936 Post-Treatment 401 0 89 167 24 40 190 7 76 31 62 1087
Baseline 130 62 0 54 0 268 43 6 0 0 8 571
Dierence 271 -62 89 113 24 -228 147 1 76 31 54 516
MSSSA001941 Post-Treatment 1013 50 175 230 119 35 332 0 65 381 80 2480
Baseline 328 58 0 172 20 0 44 0 0 0 0 622
Dierence 685 -8 175 58 99 35 288 0 65 381 80 1858
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Treatment Facilities Indications
Facility Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
MSSSA001994 Post-Treatment 214 5 105 74 0 194 640 3 0 26 21 1282
Baseline 171 54 0 35 0 22 42 8 0 0 9 341
Dierence 43 -49 105 39 0 172 598 -5 0 26 12 941
OCSSA002274 Post-Treatment 2 0 0 64 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 67
Baseline 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dierence 2 0 0 64 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 67
OCSSA005436 Post-Treatment 482 0 126 676 91 0 61 33 0 0 36 1505
Baseline 103 0 9 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 117
Dierence 379 0 117 676 91 0 56 33 0 0 36 1388
OCSSA005453 Post-Treatment 151 0 26 35 3 2 0 30 0 0 0 247
Baseline 952 21 25 545 6 40 135 6 0 0 90 1820
Dierence -801 -21 1 -510 -3 -38 -135 24 0 0 -90 -1573
OCSSA005494 Post-Treatment 1324 98 320 758 254 176 192 32 75 16 28 3273
Baseline 152 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 152
Dierence 1172 98 320 758 254 176 192 32 75 16 28 3121
SPSSA002024 Post-Treatment 1247 50 190 505 125 156 605 0 30 2 80 2990
Baseline 477 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 537
Dierence 770 -10 190 505 125 156 605 0 30 2 80 2453
SPSSA002823 Post-Treatment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Baseline 357 0 0 60 44 23 0 0 30 0 0 514
Dierence -357 0 0 -60 -44 -23 0 0 -30 0 0 -514
SPSSA000405 Post-Treatment 905 50 211 380 210 220 180 110 20 0 15 2301
Baseline 500 47 91 208 103 105 291 45 0 0 62 1452
Dierence 405 3 120 172 107 115 -111 65 20 0 -47 849
SPSSA001006 Post-Treatment 600 82 225 280 118 72 448 30 54 32 24 1965
Baseline 1067 35 108 125 45 23 71 6 0 0 35 1515
Dierence -467 47 117 155 73 49 377 24 54 32 -11 450
1110.13 Appendix E: Individual Level Results
DV: Unadjusted Quality
1 2 3 4
sex -.03 -.04 -.03 -.03
(.17) (.17) (.17) (.17)
age -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02
(.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)***
SESfactor .25 .24 .25 .25
(.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)***
black .24
(.28)
white -.27
(.18)
indigenous .32
(.75)
mulatto .04
(.18)
1120.14 Appendix F: Municipal Level Results
DV: Unadjusted Quality DV: Adjusted Quality
1 2 1 2
sex.average -.24 -.23 -.23 -.23
(.71) (.71) (.75) (.75)
age.average -.05 -.05 -.05 -.05
(.02)** (.02)** (.02)* (.02)*
avg.ses .39 .39 .41 .41
(.05)*** (.05)*** (.05)*** (.05)***
current.rev.per.cap02 .00 .00 .00 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
perc.valid02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
same00.02 .37 .35 .39 .36
(.27) (.27) (.28) (.28)
pt00.04 .36 .23 .39 .23
(.50) (.50) (.50) (.50)
tax.of.current03 .01 .01 .00 .00
(.01) (.01) (.02) (.02)
health.percap02 .00 .00
(.00) (.00)
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